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“A MIDDLE TEMPERATURE BETWEEN THE TWO”1: 
EXPLORING INTERMEDIATE REMEDIES FOR THE 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MARYLAND’S EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION STATUTE   
Marc A. DeSimone, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The law has long recognized that “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness 
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with 
instances of mistaken identification.”2  It is only in the past five 
decades, however, that the law has evaluated whether eyewitness 
identifications may be excluded from use at a criminal trial.3 
The present constitutional test is grounded in due process and 
protects a criminal defendant “against the introduction of evidence of, 
or tainted by, unreliable pretrial identifications obtained through 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures.”4  This analysis is only 
“applicable when the police have arranged suggestive circumstances 
leading the witness to identify a particular person as the perpetrator 
of a crime”5 and results in the exclusion of the identification unless 
the prosecution can show that the identification is independently 
reliable.  
In the intervening four decades since this test reached maturity, the 
advent of DNA analysis and resulting exonerations of innocent 
individuals have shown that honest, but incorrect, identifications of 
the accused are the leading cause of wrongful conviction.6  
Contemporaneously, social science has endeavored to understand 
 
* Assistant Public Defender, Maryland Office of the Public Defender (Appellate 
Division) and Lecturer of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School 
of Law.   
1. Andrew White, An Account of the Colony of the Lord Baron of Baltimore, 1633, in 
NARRATIVES OF EARLY MARYLAND 1633-1684, at 7 (Clayton Colman Hall ed., 
1910); see also Andrew White, A Briefe Relation of the Voyage unto Maryland, by 
Father Andrew White, 1634, in NARRATIVES OF EARLY MARYLAND 1633-1684, at 40, 
45 (Clayton Colman Hall ed., 1910); ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE 
TEMPERAMENT 1634-1980, at 3 (1988). 
2. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).  
3. See infra Section II.A. 
4. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977).  
5. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232 (2012).  
6. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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how eyewitness memories are formed, retained, retrieved, and 
utilized to make an identification.  The dual realization of the 
prevalence of honest, but incorrect, identifications and the underlying 
science which can produce more reliable identifications, has 
motivated several states to spurn the due process approach of the 
United States Supreme Court and adopt new standards for the 
admissibility of eyewitness identifications, which synthesize the 
present scientific understandings of eyewitness memory and 
identification with the extent legal tests.  
The United States Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of 
Appeals have refused to join this reformational trend and have 
retained the present due process based analysis.  In 2014, however, 
the Maryland General Assembly legislatively reformed the area of 
extrajudicial eyewitness identification procedures.  Specifically, as of 
January 1, 2016, Maryland law enforcement agencies are required by 
statute to adopt several reforms to extrajudicial eyewitness 
identification procedures, which social science has shown produce 
more reliable identifications.7  Thus, in Maryland, the issue is not 
whether these reforms should be adopted; these procedures are 
required as a matter of law and as a matter of Maryland public policy.  
The issue is one of enforcement: the statute requiring these 
procedures has no exclusionary provision, nor enforcement 
mechanism, and the failure to adopt or utilize the statutorily required 
procedures for creating and administering an extrajudicial 
identification procedure will not result in the suppression of a 
resulting identification.  
This article addresses what remedies should be available to a 
criminal defendant in Maryland who has been identified in an 
extrajudicial identification procedure that does not comply with the 
present statutory requirements.  Part II of this article provides an 
 
7. The scope of this article is limited to “extrajudicial” identification procedures (viz., 
procedures in which an eyewitness is asked to identify a suspect outside of the 
judicial process and outside of the view of a judge or jury (and usually outside of the 
view of the defendant or counsel)).  The most common of these extrajudicial 
procedures are photographic arrays and in-person lineups.  This reference to 
“extrajudicial” procedures is essentially coextensive with the present Maryland 
statutory definition of an “identification procedure.”  See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
SAFETY § 3-506.1(a)(8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016) (defining an “identification 
procedure” as a “procedure in which a live lineup is conducted or an array of 
photographs, including a photograph of a suspect and additional photographs of 
other persons not suspected of the offense, is displayed to an eyewitness in hard copy 
form or by computer for the purpose of determining whether the eyewitness 
identifies the suspect as the perpetrator”).  I exclude from the scope of this article 
identifications that occur under judicial oversight and in the presence of a judge or 
jury, such as an in-court identification.  
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overview of the present due process test for evaluating the 
admissibility of extrajudicial eyewitness identifications, the present 
Maryland iteration of that test, and alternatives to that approach that 
have been adopted in other jurisdictions.8  Part III reviews recent 
legislative reforms to extrajudicial identification procedures, which 
are required in Maryland as of January 1, 2016.9  Section IV.A of this 
article argues why a criminal defendant who has been identified in an 
extrajudicial procedure that does not comply with that legislative 
mandate should be afforded remedies short of suppression as a way 
to induce compliance with the legislative mandate and to better avoid 
wrongful conviction and the dire societal harms which occur when 
the true culprit is left free to re-offend.10  Section IV.B of this article 
provides an overview of the remedies a criminal defendant should be 
entitled to receive if that defendant shows that he or she was 
identified in an extrajudicial identification procedure that does not 
comply with the present statutory requirements.11  
This article suggests that if a criminal defendant shows that law 
enforcement did not meaningfully comply with a pertinent statutory 
provision regarding an extrajudicial identification procedure, that 
defendant may (1) seek to limit the introduction of that identification 
on evidentiary grounds.  The defendant should also be permitted, at 
trial, to: (2) cross-examine the law enforcement officers concerning 
the failure to employ the statutorily required procedures; (3) 
introduce expert testimony to explain how the failure to employ these 
procedures affect the reliability of the identification; (4) have the 
court propound a jury instruction concerning the statutory 
requirements and informing jurors that they may utilize the failure to 
comply with the statute in evaluating the weight to afford the 
identification; and (5) argue in closing argument that the failure to 
comply with the statute impacts the weight jurors should give to the 
identification. 
This article advocates for the provision of limited remedies short of 
suppression of the identification12 as a means to both ensure 
 
8. See infra Part II.  
9. See infra Part III.  
10. See infra Section IV.A.  Given that the statute requires law enforcement agencies to 
adopt and implement these reforms by January 1, 2016, the remedies suggested in 
this article apply only if the identification procedure was administered after that date, 
and should not be available if the identification procedure was administered before 
January 1, 2016.  
11. See infra Section IV.B.  
12. Although this article suggests that a defendant may seek an in limine ruling to 
exclude an identification on evidentiary grounds, this article uses the term 
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enforcement of the legislative mandate regarding extrajudicial 
identification procedures and to achieve the highest goals of our 
criminal justice system: to ensure the guilty are identified, convicted, 
and punished, and to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction.  
An honest, but incorrect, identification results in two independent 
transgressions of these values: when an innocent person is wrongly 
convicted, a guilty person remains free and at risk to re-offend.  
While a wrongful conviction produces an individualized and ad hoc 
harm, the fact that a dangerous criminal remains free harms society at 
large, including anyone who may be later victimized by that criminal.  
There will likely never be an adequate test to positively 
differentiate an accurate identification from an inaccurate 
identification.13  Indeed, for a defense attorney, that is often the most 
vexing issue in examining an eyewitness; the witness truly believes 
that his or her identification is correct when, in reality, it is not.  The 
issue is not one of veracity, but accuracy.  Thus, the best salve for 
honest, but incorrect, misidentification is to endeavor to improve the 
accuracy of the procedures that produce those identifications, and to 
increase the “probabilistic” chances that the identification will be 
accurate.14  
The General Assembly has required a series of procedures, which 
are designed to produce more reliable identifications.  A more 
reliable procedure produces a more reliable result; the utilization of 
these procedures should result in identifications that better identify 
the guilty and avoid the identification of the innocent.  If law 
enforcement agencies adopt and implement these procedures, the 
values of our criminal justice system are served in full.  A defendant 
is entitled to no remedy if law enforcement complies with the statute, 
and the best way to obviate any of the remedies proposed in this 
article is to do what law enforcement should be doing: comply with 
the General Assembly’s required procedures regarding extrajudicial 
 
“suppression” exclusively to refer to the exclusion of an identification on the 
constitutional due process grounds outlined in Sections II.A. and II.B.  See 
discussion infra Sections II.A–B.1. 
13. Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 417 (Alaska 2016) (“[T]he science of eyewitness 
identifications is ‘probabilistic’; it cannot say for certain whether any particular 
identification is accurate but rather identifies the variables that are relevant to 
evaluating the risk of a misidentification.”); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690 (Or. 
2012) (“[A]lthough the scientific studies we have reviewed have identified a number 
of factors that contribute to the likelihood of mistaken identification, nearly all of 
those factors are probabilistic in nature—they can indicate only a statistical 
likelihood of misidentification within a broad population of people studied, not 
whether any one identification is right or wrong.”).  
14.  See Young, 374 P.3d at 417; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 690. 
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identification procedures.  However, as previous legislative entries 
into this area have shown, the law enforcement community does not 
always comply with these legislative mandates.  If law enforcement 
agencies do not adopt these policies, or individual officers fail to 
adhere to the required procedures in creating and administering an 
individual extrajudicial identification procedure, the criminal 
defendant identified in that procedure should be permitted a series of 
limited remedies to level the playing field, temper the effect of 
unreliable identification procedures, and to induce law enforcement 
compliance with these legislative mandates.  
  
Confession of Potential Bias 
 
The reader will soon learn that, as a matter of federal due process, a 
criminal defendant is entitled to suppress an extrajudicial 
identification only if he or she shows that law enforcement arranged 
an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure that resulted in 
an irreparably unreliable identification.  Although other jurisdictions 
have adopted different tests, which allow suppression of an 
identification based upon other showings, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals recently rejected adoption of those approaches and retained 
the present due process approach in Smiley v. State.15  
The author was the attorney who argued for that change in Smiley.  
I lost.  While I am proud of my work in that case, I do not seek to re-
litigate the case in the article.  As a practicing attorney, I took an oath 
to be faithful to the laws of this State and, as a professional, I have 
the utmost respect for the highest court of our state.  This article does 
not criticize the decision in Smiley; the Court of Appeals held that the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights does not require any change to the 
present constitutional standard used to evaluate the suppression of an 
identification; that decision was eminently reasonable; causa finita 
est.  
This article, therefore, is based upon the premise that total 
suppression of an extrajudicial identification will not occur unless a 
criminal defendant shows that the identification violates due process 
principles.  Nevertheless, as this article will explain, the Maryland 
General Assembly has entered the field of extrajudicial identification 
procedures, and has required—as a matter of law, and as a matter of 
Maryland public policy—a series of practices that are both based on 
the best present scientific understandings of eyewitness memory and 
 
15. 111 A.3d 43, 56 (Md. 2015).  
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identification, which should produce more reliable identifications.  
This article seeks only to encourage and induce compliance with that 
legislative mandate.  Just as I write in total fidelity to the decisions of 
the Maryland Court of Appeals, I write to encourage equal fidelity to 
the requirements established by the legislative branch of our tripartite 
government.  
I also write this article to encourage the exploration of remedies 
short of the total suppression remedy examined in Smiley.  Since the 
creation of the due process standard nearly five decades ago, the 
evaluation of the admissibility of an eyewitness identification has 
been viewed in the all-or-nothing prism of suppression.  Given that 
the Court of Appeals has retained the very high standard for 
constitutional suppression, it is incumbent upon defense attorneys to 
explore other more limited remedies if they are unable to satisfy that 
high burden.  The time is particularly ripe for this exploration, given 
that the General Assembly has required very specific procedures that 
aim to obtain more reliable extrajudicial identifications.  The new 
legislatively required procedures are a necessary fulcrum for every 
proposal in this article.  
This article is therefore written in the very recent milieu of judicial 
retention of the existing due process standard for suppression of an 
identification and legislative adoption of particular procedures for 
obtaining extrajudicial identifications.  The author criticizes neither 
approach; to the contrary, he writes only to encourage executive—
law enforcement—compliance with the dictates of both coequal 
branches of government and to achieve the highest goals of our 
criminal justice system: the rightful punishment of the truly guilty 
and rightful acquittal of the truly innocent.  
II.   THE PRESENT TEST FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS  
A. The United States Supreme Court’s Due Process Analysis  
For nearly a half-century, as a matter of federal due process, a 
criminal defendant has been protected “against the introduction of 
evidence of, or tainted by, unreliable pretrial identifications obtained 
through unnecessarily suggestive procedures.”16  
The Supreme Court’s first foray into the constitutional implications 
of an eyewitness identification procedure stressed the importance of 
the assistance of counsel during the procedure.  In United States v. 
Wade, the Supreme Court first recognized that “the confrontation 
 
16. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977).  
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compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or 
witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly 
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might 
seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.”17  In Wade, the 
Court’s chief concern was the “manner in which the prosecution 
present[ed] the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification,”18 and 
the attendant recognition “that, once a witness has picked out the 
accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later 
on.”19  Thus, the Court ultimately found that due to the “grave 
potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup,”20 the 
accused was entitled to the aid and presence of counsel at a post-
indictment, in-person lineup procedure.21  
In the companion case of Stovall v. Denno,22 the Court also 
addressed the independent contention that “the confrontation . . . was 
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification that he was denied due process of law,” independent of 
any right to the presence of counsel at that procedure.23  Thus, apart 
from the right to counsel at an in-person lineup, the Court recognized 
an independent due process protection against an “unnecessarily 
suggestive” identification procedure.24  
In this wellspring, however, the Court rejected the per se exclusion 
of an identification obtained in violation of either the right to counsel 
or due process.  Rather, the Court fashioned a test which allowed the 
prosecution to adduce evidence of an in-court identification if, after 
consideration of a variety of factors,25 the ultimate in-court 
 
17. 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).  
18. Id. at 228–29 (“A commentator has observed that ‘[t]he influence of improper 
suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of 
justice than any other single factor—perhaps it is responsible for more such errors 
than all other factors combined.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting PATRICK M. 
WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965)).  
19. Id. at 229.  
20. Id. at 236. 
21. Id. at 236–37.  
22. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).  
23. Id. at 301–02.  
24. Id. 
25. Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (“Application of this test in the present context requires 
consideration of various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the 
alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup 
description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup 
of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, 
failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between 
the alleged act and the lineup identification.  It is also relevant to consider those facts 
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identifications were based on the witness’ observations, and not the 
unnecessarily suggestive lineup.26 
In these initial cases, the Supreme Court noted that “[a] conviction 
which rests on a mistaken identification is a gross miscarriage of 
justice,”27 and therefore, the rules it announced were “aimed at 
minimizing that possibility by preventing the unfairness at the pretrial 
confrontation that experience has proved can occur . . . .”28  Within a 
few years, it spurned both this consideration of the “unfairness” of 
the proceeding and focus upon the presence of counsel.29 
The next term, the Court elucidated upon the due process approach 
espoused in Stovall,30 and disallowed an identification that occurred 
after a procedure where “[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the 
witness, ‘This is the man,’”31 and “the pretrial confrontations clearly 
were so arranged as to make the resulting identifications virtually 
inevitable.”32  The Court also extended these principles beyond the 
in-person lineup that term.  In Simmons v. United States, the Court 
recognized both the utility of, and the potential dangers in, 
photographic identification procedures33 and held “that convictions 
based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial 
identification by photograph will be set aside . . . only if the 
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification.”34  Thus, in Simmons, the Court 
recognized that only the due process check on suggestive 
 
which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the 
lineup.”).  
26. Id. at 240.  In the companion case of Gilbert v. California, the Supreme Court also 
afforded the petitioner a remand to the lower court for it to discern whether the in-
trial identifications of Gilbert had an independent source other than the pretrial 
lineup which was conducted without counsel.  388 U.S. 263, 272–73 (1967).  The 
Gilbert Court did conclude that testimony about the lineup procedure—conducted 
without counsel—was the direct fruit of that procedure and should be suppressed.  
Id. at 273.  
27. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297.  
28. Id. at 297–98 (“[T]he Wade and Gilbert rules also are aimed at avoiding unfairness 
at the trial by enhancing the reliability of the fact-finding process in the area of 
identification evidence . . . .”).  
29. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1969). 
30. Id. at 442.  The Court again recognized that the conduct of identification procedures 
may be “‘so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification’ as to be a denial of due process of law.”  Id. 
31. Id. at 443.  
32. Id. 
33. 390 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1968). 
34. Id. at 384. 
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identification procedures recognized in Stovall applied to an 
extrajudicial photographic array.  
A few terms later, the Court held that the right to counsel at a 
lineup, as recognized in Wade and Gilbert, applied only to post-
indictment lineups.35  As to identification procedures which occurred 
prior to the filing of charges, the only recourse was, again, the due 
process grounds recognized in Simmons.36  Within a few terms, the 
Court also rejected the proposition “that the risks inherent in the use 
of photographic displays are so pernicious that an extraordinary 
system of safeguards is required,”37 and held “that the Sixth 
Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic 
displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a 
witness to attempt an identification of the offender.”38   
Within this series of cases, the Court shifted its primary attention to 
the due process analysis first recognized in Stovall.  This approach 
came to maturity in Neil v. Biggers39 and Manson v. Brathwaite.40  In 
Neil v. Biggers, the Court recognized a “relationship between 
suggestiveness and misidentification” and observed “that the primary 
evil to be avoided is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.’”41  Thus, the Court opined, it is only an 
impermissibly suggestive procedure that creates a likelihood of 
misidentification, which violates due process.42  The Court also 
iterated that the central issue was “whether under the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ the identification was reliable even though the 
confrontation procedure was suggestive.”43  After putting forward a 
variety of factors to be used in assessing whether the identification 
was reliable44 and examining them in the case at hand, the Court 
 
35. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972). 
36. Id. 
37. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). 
38. Id. 
39. 409 U.S. 188, 196–200 (1972).  
40. 432 U.S. 98, 109–14 (1977).  
41. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968)). 
42. Id. (“Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood 
of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the 
further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.”). 
43. Id. at 199. 
44. Id. at 199–200 (“As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating 
the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the 
witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the 
witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation.”). 
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found that an identification was admissible because there was “no 
substantial likelihood of misidentification.”45  
In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Supreme Court focused upon 
procedures which were both suggestive and unnecessary.46  The 
Court also viewed per se exclusion of the product of suggestive 
identification procedure as “a Draconian sanction.”47  Rather, the 
Court “conclude[d] that reliability is the linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony,”48 and the assessment of the 
overall reliability of the identification—after considering the factors 
announced in Neil v. Biggers—was to be weighed against the 
“corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”49  
For the next third of a century, there were no major modifications 
to these rules.  In Perry v. New Hampshire,50 however, the Court 
placed additional limitations upon the suppression of a pretrial 
identification.  Specifically, the Court opined that its extant due 
process limitation upon identifications was only “applicable when the 
police have arranged suggestive circumstances leading the witness to 
identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a crime.”51  After 
reviewing its prior cases on the issue, the Court iterated that “due 
process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an 
identification procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary.”52  
Even when such a procedure is employed, the Court noted, due 
process “requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether 
improper police conduct created a ‘substantial likelihood of 
misidentification.’”53 
The Court further noted that the “due process check for 
reliability . . . comes into play only after the defendant establishes 
improper police conduct.”54  To this end, the Court offered that “[a] 
primary aim of excluding identification evidence obtained under 
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances . . . is to deter law 
 
45. Id. at 201. 
46. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977). 
47. Id. at 112–13. 
48. Id. at 114. 
49. Id. 
50. 565 U.S. 228, 248 (2012). 
51. Id. at 232. 
52. Id. at 238–39 (first citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 107, 109; and then citing Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)). 
53. Id. at 239 (first quoting Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201; and then citing Brathwaite, 432 
U.S. at 116)).  
54. Id. at 241.  In dissent, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for adding to the due 
process analysis “a novel and significant limitation on our longstanding rule” 
requiring “a degree of intentional orchestration or manipulation.”  Id. at 254–55 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in 
the first place”55 and thus identified a “deterrence rationale” as a 
primary motivation for the due process check on impermissibly 
suggestive identification procedures.56  
In responding to the more recent research on eyewitness memory, 
the Court noted it “d[id] not doubt either the importance or the 
fallibility of eyewitness identifications,”57 but concluded “that the 
potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not alone render its 
introduction at the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”58  The 
Court therefore emphasized reliance upon “other safeguards built into 
our adversary system that caution juries against placing undue weight 
on eyewitness testimony of questionable reliability,”59 including: (1) 
the right to confront the eyewitness;60 (2) the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, and to counsel’s ability in cross-examination to 
“expose the flaws in the eyewitness’ testimony during cross-
examination”;61 (3) counsel’s ability to “focus the jury’s attention on 
the fallibility of such testimony during opening and closing 
arguments”;62 (4) jury instructions that “warn the jury to take care in 
appraising identification evidence”;63 (5) the use of expert testimony 
“on the hazards of eyewitness identification evidence”;64 and (6) 
reliance upon traditional rules of evidence, which “permit trial judges 
to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial impact or potential for misleading the 
jury.”65  
Thus, while the Supreme Court retained the due process test for the 
exclusion of an identification, it identified the other “safeguards built 
into our adversary system” as areas in which the defense may 
challenge unreliable eyewitness identifications.66 
 
55. Id. at 241 (majority opinion) (citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112). 
56. Id. at 241–42. 
57. Id. at 244–45. 
58. Id. at 245 (citing Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009)). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)). 
61. Id. at 246. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. (citing United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per 
curiam)). 
64. Id. at 247 (citing State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1113 (Utah 2009)). 
65. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 403; N.H. R. EVID. 403). 
66. Id. at 232, 245. 
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B. The Maryland Retention of the Supreme Court’s Due Process 
Analysis 
Maryland has adopted, and retained, the due process approach 
espoused by the Supreme Court.  Specifically, under Maryland law 
there is a “two-step” inquiry a court must conduct in determining 
whether to suppress an extrajudicial identification.67  First, a court 
must determine if the identification procedure was impermissibly 
suggestive.68  In this inquiry, a court should be mindful that 
“[s]uggestiveness can arise during the presentation of a photo array 
when the manner itself of presenting the array to the witness or the 
makeup of the array indicates which photograph the witness should 
identify.”69  If the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to 
the prosecution to show that,70 under the totality of the circumstances, 
the identification is nevertheless reliable.71  In examining the 
underlying reliability of the identification, Maryland courts rely upon 
the factors announced in Neil v. Biggers.72  
In Smiley v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals was presented 
with, and rejected, a request to adopt some of the approaches adopted 
in other jurisdictions.73  The Court of Appeals “decline[d] to do so, 
because this Court, as well as the Court of Special Appeals, have 
consistently reaffirmed application of the [two-step] 
 
67. Smiley v. State, 111 A.3d 43, 49–50 (Md. 2015) (citing Jones v. State, 530 A.2d 
743, 747 (Md. 1987)).  
68. Id. at 50 (citing Jones, 530 A.2d at 747).  The defense has the burden of making this 
initial showing.  Graves v. State, 619 A.2d 123, 139 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); 
Loud v. State, 493 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).  
69. Id. (first citing Jones, 530 A.2d at 747; and then citing Conyers v. State, 691 A.2d 
802, 806 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)).  The Court of Special Appeals has also made 
clear that, in this inquiry, “[t]he sin is to contaminate the test by slipping the answer 
to the testee.”  Conyers, 691 A.2d at 806.  
70. The prosecution has the burden to “prove by clear and convincing evidence the 
existence of reliability in the identification that outweighs the corrupting effect of the 
suggestive procedure.”  Loud, 493 A.2d at 1094 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 
U.S. 98 (1977); Godwin v. State, 382 A.2d 596 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Smith v. 
State, 250 A.2d 285 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969)).  
71. Smiley, 111 A.3d at 50 (citing Jones v. State, 909 A.2d 650, 658 (Md. 2006)).  
72. See Jones, 530 A.2d at 747; see also Thomas v. State, 74 A.3d 746, 763–64 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2013); In re Matthew S., 23 A.3d 250, 256 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); 
Wood v. State, 7 A.3d 1115, 1123–24 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).  Further, “[t]hese 
factors are to be considered within the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
identification.”  Brockington v. State, 582 A.2d 568, 572 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) 
(citing Foster v. State, 323 A.2d 419 (Md. 1974); Green v. State, 558 A.2d 441 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1989)). 
73. Smiley, 111 A.3d at 51–53.  Specifically, petitioner proposed adoption of the 
standard similar to that adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henderson.  
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); see infra note 84 and accompanying 
text.  
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procedure . . . for examining challenges to the admissibility of 
eyewitness identifications.”74  The Court further iterated “our 
jurisprudence already provides suitable means to assay an eyewitness 
identification”75 and thus hewed to the extant two-step due process 
test used to assess the admissibility of extrajudicial identifications.  
C. Alternative Approaches Adopted by other Jurisdictions 
While the Supreme Court76 and Maryland77 have stood by the 
existing due process approach used to evaluate the admissibility of 
extrajudicial identifications, and have rejected invitations to modify 
this approach, other jurisdictions have experimented with alternative 
tests.  This experimentation finds its basis in two developments, 
which have occurred since the due process approach obtained 
maturity in Manson v. Brathwaite:78 (1) the recognition that honest, 
but erroneous, identifications are the leading cause of wrongful 
convictions; and (2) the development of a wealth of social science, 
which has endeavored to understand how eyewitness memories are 
formed, stored, and retrieved.79  The jurisdictions that now examine 
and suppress eyewitness identifications on grounds other than the 
federal due process approach do so either on state constitutional 
grounds, or through application of state evidentiary law.80  
 
74. Smiley, 111 A.3d at 52.  The Court referred to its decision in (Gregory) Jones as its 
wellspring for this approach.  The Court had actually adopted the Supreme Court’s 
due process analysis a year earlier in Webster v. State, 474 A.2d 1305, 1314–16 (Md. 
1984).  
75. Smiley, 111 A.3d at 53.  
76. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 234, 245 (2012). 
77. Smiley, 111 A.3d at 49–50.  
78. See 432 U.S. 98, 113–14 (1977). 
79. See State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299–300 (Tenn. 2007). 
80. By “different grounds,” I mean grounds other than the “two-step” process required 
under Maryland and Supreme Court case law, which requires an initial showing of 
impermissible suggestiveness and then assesses whether the resulting identification 
is independently reliable.  See discussion supra Sections II.A–B.  I exclude from this 
discussion those jurisdictions, such as New York and Massachusetts, who have 
adopted a “rule of per se exclusion of evidence from unnecessarily suggestive pre-
trial identification procedures.”  Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pitfalls 
of State Eyewitness Identification Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99, 122 (2015).  Wisconsin 
has also adopted a rule of per se exclusion which “applies only to unnecessarily 
suggestive, in-person, pre-trial showups and not to any other kind of identification 
procedure.”  Id. at 139.  Utah and Kansas have abandoned the Manson approach 
“through modification of the reliability factors used to decide whether identification 
evidence is admissible despite the use of an unnecessarily suggestive procedure.”  Id. 
at 146.  These jurisdictions all require a predicate showing of suggestive pre-trial 
procedure (i.e., the first step of Maryland’s “two-step” approach), and have either 
eliminated, or modified, the second step of the existing analysis.  North Carolina and 
 
410 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
 
1. Reasons for the Adoption of New Standards 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the due process 
checks upon extrajudicial eyewitness identification procedures 
reached maturity when Manson v. Brathwaite was decided in 1977.81  
In the intervening four decades there have been two critical 
developments that have caused other jurisdictions to examine 
alternative approaches to evaluating the admissibility of extrajudicial 
identifications.  The first is the advent of DNA technology, 
corresponding exonerations of wrongly convicted individuals, and the 
recognition that eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of 
wrongful conviction.82  Indeed, “erroneous identifications [a]re 
responsible for more wrongful convictions than any other single 
factor.”83  DNA-based exonerations have provided an X-ray 
examination of the criminal justice system that has exposed latent 
flaws and a corresponding need for remedy in a system previously 
thought to be in much better health.   
Second, there is a field of social science that has endeavored to 
understand how eyewitness memories are formed, stored, and 
retrieved; thus, this helps identify factors that may produce an honest, 
though incorrect, identification.  This “vast body of scientific 
research about human memory has emerged” in the decades since the 
Supreme Court adopted the present test and “casts doubt on some 
commonly held views relating to memory,” as well as “the vitality of 
the current legal framework for analyzing the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications.”84  
 
Ohio have adopted a series of statutory requirements for extrajudicial eyewitness 
identification procedures, and these statutes “require judges to consider 
noncompliance when adjudicating suppression motions and . . . require judges to 
instruct juries that they may consider noncompliance in evaluating the reliability of 
eyewitness evidence.”  Id. at 150.  This article is necessitated by the fact that the 
Maryland statute, unlike the North Carolina or Ohio statutes, provides for no remedy 
or enforcement mechanism. 
81. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 113–14. 
82. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 8–9 (2011) (documenting that in 190 of the first 250 
DNA-based exonerations (76%), the conviction was based on an incorrect 
eyewitness identification); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 690 n.5 (Or. 2012); 
Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 299. 
83. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S 
TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 45 (2009), 
https://www.nysba.org/wcreport/; see Bomas v. State, 987 A.2d 98, 109 (Md. 2010). 
84. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 877 (N.J. 2011) (first citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 
at 114; and then citing State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254 (N.J.1988)); see also id. at 
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The conflux of these two factors—the realization that honest, but 
incorrect, identifications are the leading cause of wrongful 
conviction, and the identification of the factors which can produce (or 
reduce) those incorrect identifications—have caused other 
jurisdictions to reevaluate the efficacy of the present due process 
standard as the sole check on the admissibility of an extrajudicial 
identification.  
2. State Constitutional Limitations on the Admissibility of 
Eyewitness Identifications  
In State v. Henderson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey became 
the first court to utilize a state constitution to make inroads on the 
federal due process test adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court.85  In Henderson, after the parties questioned the efficacy of the 
present standard, the Supreme Court of New Jersey remanded the 
case for an evidentiary hearing where “[t]he parties and amici 
collectively produced more than 360 exhibits, which included more 
than 200 published scientific studies on human memory and 
eyewitness identification.”86  At this hearing, the prosecution and 
defense communities both presented an array of social scientists who 
identified “broad consensus within the scientific community on the 
relevant scientific issues”87 and the “gold standard in terms of the 
applicability of social science research to the law.”88  This social 
science was vetted through both peer reviews and meta-analysis 
reviews, which collate and evaluate all available data in a specified 
topic area.89  The Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately adopted 
 
892 (“Virtually all of the scientific evidence . . . emerged after Manson.”); Lawson, 
291 P.3d at 678 (noting that in the past three decades, “there have been considerable 
developments in both the law and the science on which this court previously relied in 
determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence” and, in light of 
those developments, “revis[ing] the test” for admissibility). 
85. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919 & n.10. 
86. Id. at 884. 
87. Id. at 884–85, 911. 
88. Id. at 916.  The Henderson and Lawson decisions provide an excellent overview of 
the scientific research regarding eyewitness memory and identification.  See id. at 
892–912; Lawson, 291 P.3d at 700–11.  Professor Kahn-Fogel has also provided an 
excellent précis of the present state of the social science concerning eyewitness 
memory and identification.  See Kahn-Fogel, supra note 80, at 109–20.  This 
underlying science is beyond the scope of this article, and these decisions and article 
are commended to the reader who wishes to read more about the social science 
which has caused several jurisdictions (and the Maryland General Assembly) to 
reform eyewitness identification procedures.  
89. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 892–93. 
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the report issued by the hearing judge and credited this scientific 
research as “convincing proof that the current test for evaluating the 
trustworthiness of eyewitness identifications should be revised.”90  
After reviewing the social science concerning eyewitness memory 
and identification, the Henderson court ultimately concluded “that 
eyewitnesses generally act in good faith” and that “[m]ost 
misidentifications stem from the fact that human memory is 
malleable; they are not the result of malice.”91  This is because 
“memory is a constructive, dynamic, and selective process,” which 
“consists of three stages,” —acquisition, retention, and retrieval—and 
“[a]t each of those stages, the information ultimately offered as 
‘memory’ can be distorted, contaminated and even falsely 
imagined.”92  Indeed, “an array of variables can affect and dilute 
[eyewitness] memory and lead to misidentifications.”93  The 
scientific community and the Henderson court divide these variables 
into two groups: (1) “[s]ystem variables,” which “are factors like 
lineup procedures which are within the control of the criminal justice 
system”;94 and (2) “[e]stimator variables,” which “are factors related 
to the witness, the perpetrator, or the event itself—like distance, 
lighting, or stress—over which the legal system has no control.”95  
System variables—which are the factors entirely within the control 
of the criminal justice system and law enforcement community—
include the following factors: 
1. Blind Administration: Was the lineup procedure 
performed double-blind?  If double-blind testing was 
impractical, did the police use a technique . . . to ensure that 
the administrator had no knowledge of where the suspect 
appeared in the photo array or lineup? 
2. Pre-identification Instructions: Did the administrator 
provide neutral, pre-identification instructions warning that 
the suspect may not be present in the lineup and that the 
witness should not feel compelled to make an identification? 
3. Lineup Construction: Did the array or lineup contain only 
one suspect embedded among at least five innocent fillers?  
Did the suspect stand out from other members of the lineup? 
 
90. Id. at 877. 
91. Id. at 888. 
92. Id. at 894. 
93. Id. at 895. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
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4. Feedback: Did the witness receive any information or 
feedback, about the suspect or the crime, before, during, or 
after the identification procedure? 
5. Recording Confidence: Did the administrator record the 
witness’ statement of confidence immediately after the 
identification, before the possibility of any confirmatory 
feedback? 
6. Multiple Viewings: Did the witness view the suspect 
more than once as part of multiple identification 
procedures?  Did police use the same fillers more than once? 
7. Showups: Did the police perform a showup more than 
two hours after an event?  Did the police warn the witness 
that the suspect may not be the perpetrator and that the 
witness should not feel compelled to make an identification? 
8. Private Actors: Did law enforcement elicit from the 
eyewitness whether he or she had spoken with anyone about 
the identification and, if so, what was discussed? 
9. Other Identifications Made: Did the eyewitness initially 
make no choice or choose a different suspect or filler?96 
Estimator variables, which are the factors related to the witness, 
the perpetrator, or the event, which the legal system cannot control, 
include factors such as: 
1.  Stress: Did the event involve a high level of stress? 
2. Weapon focus: Was a visible weapon used during a crime 
of short duration? 
3. Duration: How much time did the witness have to observe 
the event? 
4. Distance and Lighting: How close were the witness and 
perpetrator?  What were the lighting conditions at the time? 
5. Witness Characteristics: Was the witness under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs?  Was age a relevant factor 
under the circumstances of the case? 
6. Characteristics of Perpetrator: Was the culprit wearing a 
disguise?  Did the suspect have different facial features at 
the time of the identification? 
7. Memory [D]ecay: How much time elapsed between the 
crime and the identification? 
 
96. Id. at 920–21.  There is an excellent overview of the science animating the adoption 
of these factors in Lawson.  State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 686–87 (Or. 2012).  
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8. Racial Bias: Does the case involve a cross-racial 
identification?97 
The list of estimator variables also includes the five factors 
announced in Neil v. Biggers, which are presently used to assess the 
ultimate reliability of an identification.98  
After reviewing this science, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
ultimately concluded in Henderson that the present due process 
approach “does not adequately meet its stated goals: it does not 
provide a sufficient measure for reliability, it does not deter, and it 
overstates the jury’s innate ability to evaluate eyewitness 
testimony.”99  Thus, as a matter of state constitutional law,100 the 
court rejected the present approach and replaced it with one that 
“addresses its shortcomings,”101 “allows judges to consider all 
relevant factors that affect reliability in deciding whether an 
identification is admissible,”102 minimizes “factors that can be 
corrupted by suggestiveness,”103 and thus, “promotes deterrence in a 
meaningful way” and “help[s] jurors both understand and evaluate 
the effects that various factors have on memory.”104  
Under the approach adopted in Henderson, the defendant still has 
the prima facie burden to demonstrate that an identification 
procedure was impermissibly suggestive, but may make that 
showing by establishing the presence of any “system variable.”105  If 
the defendant shows that the procedure was suggestive by proving 
the presence of a system variable, the burden shifts to the State to 
show the reliability of the identification.106  In evaluating reliability, 
“courts should consider . . . system variables as well as the . . . non-
exhaustive list of estimator variables to evaluate the overall 
reliability of an identification and determine its admissibility.”107  
To reiterate, this approach does not alter the current regime in 
which the defendant must first prove that the identification procedure 
 
97. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921.  Again, Lawson provides a very comprehensive 
overview of the science behind the adoption of these factors.  Lawson, 291 P.3d at 
687–88.  
98. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 
(1972)).  
99. Id. at 918. 
100. Id. at 919 n.10. 




105. Id. at 920. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 921. 
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was impermissibly suggestive, and if so, the identification is 
suppressed unless the State can establish that the identification is 
independently reliable.  That remains unchanged.  The only 
alteration is that the evaluation of suggestiveness now considers the 
presence of any “system variable,” such as the factors “within the 
control of the criminal justice system,”108 and the assessment of 
reliability includes both those considerations, as well as any 
“estimator variables,” which “are factors related to the witness, the 
perpetrator, or the event itself—like distance, lighting, or stress—
over which the legal system has no control.”109  That is the only 
change announced in Henderson.  
New Jersey is not the only jurisdiction that has spurned the present 
due process approach—which is triggered again only upon a 
showing that “police have arranged suggestive circumstances leading 
the witness to identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a 
crime”110—in favor of a test which requires the defendant to show 
only the presence of a “system variable.”  Idaho has done so, finding 
that the use of system and estimator variables “dovetail[s] nicely 
with the two-step analysis this Court applies to determine whether 
evidence of an out-of-court identification violates due process.”111  
More recently, the Supreme Court of Alaska has held that the due 
process protections of the Alaska constitution required the court to 
depart from the federal due process approach.112  In so doing, the 
court noted that “[d]evelopments in the science related to the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications” undermined its confidence 
in the existing due process test as being sufficiently protective of a 
defendant’s due process rights.113  In this regard, the Young court 
noted that the current due process approach “does not adequately 
assess reliability” and fails to consider many of the factors that are 
now known to affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification.114  
The court ultimately adopted an approach modeled off of the 
Henderson approach, in which the defendant must present “some 
evidence” of suggestiveness in the procedure that is tied to the 
presence of a system variable.115  The court noted that “a defendant 
 
108. Id. at 895. 
109. Id. 
110. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2012). 
111. State v. Almaraz, 301 P.3d 242, 252 (Idaho 2013). 
112. See Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 412–13 (Alaska 2016). 
113. Id. at 413. 
114. Id. at 425. 
115. Id. at 427. 
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need not show that a procedure was ‘unnecessarily suggestive’ in 
order to get a hearing; that the identification involved a system 
variable is itself enough to trigger that process.”116  Upon such a 
showing, the burden shifts to the State to adduce evidence that the 
identification is nevertheless reliable.117  A court undertaking this 
inquiry “should consider all relevant system and estimator variables 
under the totality of the circumstances” and “should not hesitate to 
take expert testimony that explains, supplements, or challenges the 
application of these variables to different fact situations.”118  
Ultimately, the defendant bears the burden of showing a “very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”119  The court 
also noted that if the defendant fails to make this showing, the court 
should admit the identification but “provide the jury with an 
instruction appropriate to the context of the case.”120  
3. State Evidentiary Limitations on the Admissibility of 
Extrajudicial Identifications 
Other jurisdictions have recognized the utility of employing 
system and estimator variables in assessing the admissibility of 
eyewitness identifications, but have done so under state evidentiary 
principles.  In State v. Lawson,121 the Supreme Court of Oregon 
refrained from addressing the continuing viability of the test for the 
constitutional admissibility of an identification because the test was 
“inconsistent with modern scientific findings” and “at odds with its 
own goals and with current Oregon evidence law.”122  Under the 
approach adopted in Lawson, a court presumes that an identification 
is relevant and admissible if the proponent establishes that the 
witness “had an adequate opportunity to observe or otherwise 
personally perceive” the facts relating to the identification, and that 
the identification is both rationally based on those perceptions and 
helpful to the fact finder.123  Once the proponent establishes the 
prima facie relevance of the identification, the court is tasked with 
evaluating the relative probity of that identification by assessing its 






120. Id.  The court also tasked the Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions Committee 
with drafting a model instruction consistent with the principles reviewed in the 
court’s decision.  Id. at 428. 
121. 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
122. Id. at 688. 
123. See id. at 692. 
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system variables alone or in combination with estimator variables—
that weigh against reliability of the identification, the less persuasive 
the identification evidence will be to prove the fact of 
identification.”124  The relative probity must then be assessed against 
the potential for unfair prejudice, recognizing that “eyewitness 
identifications subjected to suggestive police procedures are 
particularly susceptible to concerns of unfair prejudice” and that “in 
cases in which an eyewitness has been exposed to suggestive police 
procedures, trial courts have a heightened role as an evidentiary 
gatekeeper because ‘traditional’ methods of testing reliability—like 
cross-examination—can be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or 
inaccurate eyewitness identification evidence.”125  The court may 
then either exclude the identification in toto, or has discretion to 
exclude particular aspects of the identifications that are especially 
prejudicial or unreliable.126 
4. The Primary Distinctions of the Alternative Approaches 
The state constitutional approach and the state evidentiary 
approach share the common denominator of utilizing system and 
estimator variables to assess the admissibility of an eyewitness 
identification.  In New Jersey, Alaska, and Idaho, those variables are 
used to assess whether the identification should be suppressed as a 
constitutional matter.  In Oregon, they are relevant in assessing the 
relative probity of the identification, the potential for unfair 
prejudice (viz., an erroneous identification), and ultimately, the 
evidentiary admissibility of the identification.  In each jurisdiction 
these variables, which rely upon and reflect the present “gold 
standard” of social science research, guide courts in assessing the 
admissibility of an identification and help ensure that reliable 
identifications are presented to a jury. 
There are additional aspects of these alternative approaches which 
differentiate them from the present due process approach.  First, the 
courts that have adopted these alternative tests recognize that the 
system and estimator variables listed in the opinion “are not 
exclusive.  Nor are they intended to be frozen in time.”127  Rather, 
Henderson “recognize[d] that scientific research relating to the 
reliability of eyewitness evidence is dynamic” and did not “intend to 
 
124. Id. at 694. 
125. Id. at 695. 
126. Id. at 694–95, 697. 
127. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 922 (N.J. 2011). 
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hamstring police departments or limit them from improving 
practices” or preclude lower courts “from reviewing evolving, 
substantial, and generally accepted scientific research.”128  Thus, 
courts may “consider variables differently or entertain new ones” so 
long as they “rely on reliable scientific evidence that is generally 
accepted by experts in the community.”129  Likewise, Lawson notes 
that it did not “intend[] to preclude any party in a specific case from 
validating scientific acceptance of further research or from 
challenging particular aspects of the research described in this 
opinion.”130  Thus, these courts recognize that as law confronts 
emerging science, the solution is dynamic progress, not static 
entrenchment; this aggiornamento ensures that current law reflects 
current science and ensures that the two develop in harmony.  
One distinction of the approach developed in Oregon is that, unlike 
the due process approach (or the state constitutional approach 
championed in New Jersey), it does not pertain solely to 
identification procedures arranged by law enforcement.  Because the 
due process approach is constitutional in nature, it requires a 
showing of state action (viz., that law enforcement agents are the 
ones who have arranged the suggestive circumstances).131  Under the 
evidentiary approach adopted in Lawson, “there is no reason to 
hinder the analysis of eyewitness reliability with purposeless 
distinctions between suggestiveness and other sources of 
unreliability.”132 
The evidentiary approach espoused in Lawson relieves the 
defendant from showing the presence of a suggestive identification 
procedure.133  Rather, in tying the analysis to rules of evidence, the 
Lawson court requires the proponent—the State, and not the 
defendant—to show that this evidence has the requisite probity to be 
submitted to the jury.134  This approach ultimately focuses on the 
reliability of the identification and the quality of the evidence 
submitted at trial, rather than focusing on the conduct of the police 
officers in trying to impermissibly secure an identification from a 
suggestive procedure.  
 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (citing State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 136 (N.J. 2008); State v. Moore, 902 A.2d 
1212, 1226 (N.J. 2006); Rubanick v. Wito Chem., 593 A.2d 733, 739 (N.J. 1991)). 
130. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 686. 
131. See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2012); Young v. State, 
374 P.3d 395, 417 (Alaska 2016) (quoting Perry, 565 U.S. at 232). 
132. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 688–89. 
133. See id. at 693. 
134. Id. 
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III.  MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS TO EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 
While the Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have 
rejected attempts to modify the due process strictures on 
extrajudicial identification procedures, the Maryland General 
Assembly has twice legislatively attempted to reform these 
procedures in Maryland.  Indeed, the General Assembly has now 
required extrajudicial identification procedures that are fully in 
keeping with the “estimator” and “system” variables recognized in 
other jurisdictions such as New Jersey, Alaska, and Oregon.  As this 
article will explore further, the issue is not one of reform—
Maryland, by statute, requires extrajudicial identification procedures 
that are in keeping with the state of the art knowledge of eyewitness 
memory, recall, and identification.  The issue, moving forward, is 
how to ensure compliance with that reformational legislative 
mandate.  
In 2007, the Maryland General Assembly first entered the field of 
extrajudicial identification procedures.  Specifically, as of December 
1, 2007, the General Assembly required “each law enforcement 
agency in the State” to “adopt written policies relating to eyewitness 
identification that comply with the United States Department of 
Justice standards on obtaining accurate eyewitness 
identification[s].”135  The General Assembly further required each 
law enforcement agency in the State to have the written policies on 
file with the State Police by December 1, 2008136 and directed the 
State Police to compile and allow public inspection of each policy.137 
Thus, as of December 1, 2008, each law enforcement agency in 
Maryland was required to adopt, and have on file, a policy pertaining 
to eyewitness identification procedures that complied with the 
Department of Justice’s best practices.  These “best practices” 
emanate from a comprehensive overview, Eyewitness Evidence, A 
Guide for Law Enforcement, published by the Department of Justice 
in 1999.138  This guide was authored by a working group comprised 
 
135. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(a) (LexisNexis 2011); H.B. 103, 2007 Leg., 
423rd Sess. (Md. 2007).   
136. PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(b).  
137. Id. §§ 3-506(c)(1)–(2).  
138. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A 
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999) [hereinafter Eyewitness Evidence], 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.  The Fiscal and Policy Note for the 
statute requiring such policies referred to Eyewitness Evidence directly, noting that it 
“detail[ed] recommended procedures for obtaining reliable eyewitness evidence 
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of individuals from law enforcement, prosecution, defense, and 
scientific research communities,139 and relied upon the existing 
research concerning eyewitness memory and identification.140  
The Eyewitness Evidence guide has sections pertaining to the 
response of initial law enforcement responders,141 mug books,142 
composite drawings,143 subsequent interviews with eyewitnesses,144 
show-up identification procedures,145 and identification procedures, 
such as an in-person or photographic lineup.146  With regard to 
photographic identification procedures, Eyewitness Evidence 
requires:  
(1) the use of only one suspect in each procedure;147 
(2) the selection of fillers who fit the description of the 
perpetrator;148  
(3) the use of a minimum of five fillers;149  
(4) the avoidance of fillers who closely resemble the 
suspect;150  
(5) the presentation of a consistent appearance between the 
suspect and the filler;151  
(6) the placement of a suspect in a different position in each 
lineup;152  
(7) the use of new fillers in multiple lineups shown to the 
same witness;153  
(8) the avoidance of any information concerning previous 
arrests;154  
(9) the viewing of the array to ensure that the suspect does 
not stand-out;155 and  
 
through line-ups, field identifications, mug shot books, and other methods.”  MD. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS WRITTEN POLICIES, H.B. 423-
103, at 2 (2007), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2007RS/fnotes/bil_0003/hb0103.pdf.   
139. EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 138, at 5. 
140. Id. at 1–2. 
141. Id. at 13–16. 
142. Id. at 17–20. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 21–25. 
145. Id. at 27–28. 
146. Id. at 29–38. 




151. Id. at 29–30. 
152. Id. at 30. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
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(10) the preservation of the presentation order and 
photographs used in the procedure.156  
Eyewitness Evidence requires the use of instructions before the 
identification procedure,157 requires police to avoid saying anything 
to influence a selection or reporting to the witness any information 
concerning the identification prior to obtaining a statement of 
certainty,158 and requires documentation of the procedure, including 
the date and time of the procedure, as well as the identification of all 
those present.159 Finally, police are required to obtain a statement 
concerning the witness’s identification,160 including any 
identification or non-identification that results in writing, signed by 
the witness, including a statement of certainty in the witness’s own 
words.161  
In 2014, the Maryland General Assembly again entered the area of 
eyewitness identification procedures.162  Specifically, as of January 
1, 2016,163 the General Assembly required “each law enforcement 
agency in the State” to either “adopt the Police Training 
Commission’s Eyewitness Identification Model Policy”164 or to 
“adopt and implement a written policy relating to identification 
procedures that complies with § 3-506.1 of this subtitle.”165  The 
legislature further required each law enforcement agency to file a 
copy of the policy with the Maryland State Police,166 and required 
the State Police to compile these policies and have them available for 




157. Id. at 31–33. 
158. Id. at 33. 
159. Id. at 35. 
160. Id. at 38. 
161. Id. 
162. MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION –
PROCEDURES, H.B.  1200, 434th Sess., at 3 (2014). 
163. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(d)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).  
164. Id. § 3-506(d)(1)(i)(1).  The Police Training Commission is a part of the Maryland 
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services.  Id. § 3-202 (LexisNexis 
2011).  The Police Training Commission is charged with establishing standards and 
accrediting a variety of training and certifications of law enforcement officers in the 
state of Maryland.  See id. § 3-207 (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2016).  
165. Id. § 3-506(d)(1)(i)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).  
166. Id. § 3-506(d)(1)(ii). 
167. Id. §§ 3-506(d)(2)–(3).  
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The General Assembly deferred to the model eyewitness 
identification policy of the Police Training Commission,168 and 
legislatively adopted a model eyewitness identification policy,169 
requiring compliance with either policy by January 1, 2016.170  What 
is significant about the legislative creation of these required policies 
is that it (1) responded to the adoption of alternative methods for 
assessing the admissibility of an extrajudicial identification and the 
rejection of those methods by the Supreme Court, and (2) was a 
legislative response to significant non-compliance with the General 
Assembly’s previous mandate.   
The statute’s legislative history noted that before the statute was 
proposed, New Jersey had “issued sweeping new rules that make it 
easier for criminal defendants to challenge eyewitness 
identification.”171  The legislative history further noted that the 
Supreme Court held in Perry that due process “does not require a 
judge to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the reliability of an 
eyewitness’s identification when law enforcement did not use 
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances to procure the 
identification.”172  The statute’s legislative history, therefore, shows 
that the General Assembly deliberately sought to navigate between 
the Scylla of the retention of the current due process approach in 
Perry and the Charybdis of the more liberal approach espoused in 
Henderson, and to adopt reforms in Maryland that lie between the 
two approaches (i.e., “a middle temperature between the two”).173  
The General Assembly also sought to legislatively reform 
eyewitness identification procedures because of significant law 
enforcement non-compliance with its prior legislative mandates.  As 
noted, since 2007 each law enforcement agency in Maryland had 
been required to adopt a written policy which complied with the 
Department of Justice’s best practices (codified in Eyewitness 
Evidence).174  The Fiscal and Policy Note for the 2014 statute reports 
that the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project surveyed and analyzed each 
written policy submitted pursuant to the prior statute and that 
 
168. See id. § 3-506(d)(1)(i)(1). 
169. Id. §§ 3-506(d)(1)(i)(1)–(2), 3-506.1.  
170. Id. § 3-506(d)(1). 
171. MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION – 
PROCEDURES, H.B. 1200, 434th Sess., at 3 (2014).  The fiscal note further relates 
that, under Henderson, “whenever a defendant presents evidence that a witness’s 
identification of a suspect was influenced in any way, a judge must hold a hearing to 
consider a range of issues related to the validity of the identification.”  Id. 
172. Id. (citing Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 248 (2012)). 
173. BRUGGER, supra note 1, at 3. 
174. PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(a) (LexisNexis 2011).  
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seventeen percent of all law enforcement agencies did not have any 
written policies pertaining to identification procedures; thirty percent 
of law enforcement agencies had policies that did not comply with 
any of the key recommendations of the Department of Justice; 
twenty-six percent of law enforcement agencies had a policy that 
partially complied with the Department of Justice’s 
recommendations; and only twenty-seven percent of law 
enforcement agencies had adopted a policy that fully complied with 
each of Department of Justice’s key recommendations.175  Again, it 
must be repeated: forty-seven percent of law enforcement agencies 
had not complied with the prior legislative mandate in any 
meaningful way (by either not adopting a policy or adopting a policy 
that did not comply with any requisite aspect of Eyewitness 
Evidence), and only twenty-seven percent had fully complied with 
the prior requirement.  The review of the 2014 statute, and the 
evaluation of whether remedies should be available to induce law 
enforcement compliance with this statute,176 should therefore 
consider that this statute was passed in response to significant law 
enforcement non-compliance with the prior legislative reforms 
pertaining to eyewitness identification procedures.   
The legislative model policy, codified in Section 3-506.1, is 
notable for the progressive changes in identification procedures 
required by the General Assembly (which are well in keeping with 
the science pertaining to system and estimator variables).  The policy 
requires the use of pre-identification instructions177 and requires the 
administrator to “document in writing all identification statements 
made by the eyewitness.”178  The policy also requires that “[a]n 
 
175. MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION – 
PROCEDURES, H.B. 1200, 434th Sess., at 3 (2014).  
176. See supra Parts III–IV.  
177. PUB. SAFETY § 3-506.1(b)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).  Specifically, “[b]efore an 
identification procedure is conducted, an eyewitness shall be instructed, without 
other eyewitnesses present, that the perpetrator may or may not be among the 
persons in the identification procedure.”  Id. 
178. Id. § 3-506.1(b)(4).  An “[i]dentification statement” is:  
 [A] documented statement that is sought by the administrator 
when an identification is made: (i) from the eyewitness; (ii) in the 
own words of the eyewitness, describing the eyewitness’s 
confidence level that the person identified is the perpetrator of the 
crime; (iii) given at the time of the viewing by the eyewitness 
during the identification procedure; and (iv) given before the 
eyewitness is given feedback. 
     Id. § 3-506.1(a)(9). 
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identification procedure”179 must “be conducted by a blind or 
blinded administrator.”180  
The statue also requires the use of “fillers”181 and that “each filler 
shall resemble the description of the perpetrator given by the 
eyewitness in significant physical features, including any unique or 
unusual features.”182  Further, if a witness has previously participated 
in an identification procedure, “the fillers in the identification 
procedure shall be different from the fillers used in any prior 
identification procedure.”183  If there are multiple eyewitnesses, the 
statute requires that each identification procedure be conducted 
separately for each eyewitness;184 that the suspect be placed in a 
different position for each separate identification procedure;185 and 
that the eyewitnesses may not communicate with each other until all 
the procedures have been completed.186  
 
179. The statute defines an “[i]dentification procedure” as: 
 [A] “procedure in which a live lineup is conducted or an array of 
photographs, including a photograph of a suspect and additional 
photographs of other persons not suspected of the offense, is 
displayed to an eyewitness in hard copy form or by computer for 
the purpose of determining whether the eyewitness identifies the 
suspect as the perpetrator. 
  Id. § 3-506.1(a)(8). 
180. Id. § 3-506.1(b)(1).  For purposes of the statute, “‘[b]lind’ means the administrator 
does not know the identity of the suspect” and “‘blinded’ means the administrator 
may know who the suspect is but does not know which lineup member is being 
viewed by the eyewitness.”  Id. §§ 3-506.1(a)(3)–(4).  The statute also provides that 
“[a]n administrator may be blinded through the use of: (i) an automated computer 
program that prevents the administrator from seeing which photos the eyewitness is 
viewing until after the identification procedure is completed; or: (ii) the folder 
shuffle method.”  Id. §§ 3-506.1(b)(2)(i)–(ii).  The “folder shuffle method,” which 
must also comply with the other components of the statute, is “a system for 
conducting a photo lineup that . . . is conducted by placing photographs in folders, 
randomly numbering the folders, shuffling the folders, and then presenting the 
folders sequentially so that the administrator cannot see or track which photograph is 
being presented to the eyewitness until after the procedure is completed.”  Id. § 3-
506.1(a)(7)(ii). 
181. A “[f]iller” is “a person or a photograph who is not suspected of an offense and is 
included in an identification procedure.”  Id. § 3-506.1(a)(6).  The statute requires 
that “at least five fillers, in addition to the suspect, shall be included when an array 
of photographs is displayed to an eyewitness” and that “at least four fillers, in 
addition to the suspect, shall be included in a live lineup.”  Id. § 3-506.1(c)(2)–(3). 
182. Id. § 3-506.1(c)(1). 
183. Id. § 3-506.1(d). 
184. Id. § 3-506.1(e)(1). 
185. Id. § 3-506.1(e)(2). 
186. Id. § 3-506.1(e)(3). 
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Finally, the statute requires written documentation of the 
identification procedure,187 including: (1) all identification and non-
identification results obtained during the procedure;188 (2) the signed 
identification statement of the eyewitness;189 (3) the names of all 
persons present at the procedure;190 (4) the date and time of the 
procedure;191 (5) whether the witness identified a “filler”;192 and (6) 
all photographs used in the procedure.193  Police are excused from 
documenting these details in writing if a video or audio recording of 
the procedure captures all of the requisite information.194  
The model policy of the Maryland Police Training Commission is 
essentially congruent.195  The policy requires blind administration196 
and encourages officers to “make an effort to prevent eyewitnesses 
from comparing their recollections of the offender or the incident” 
by “promptly separating the witnesses and interviewing each out of 
the earshot of the others.”197  Like the statutory policy, the model 
policy commands that “[w]itnesses should not participate in 
identification procedures together.”198  The model policy, like the 
statutory policy, requires written documentation of any identification 
statement.199  
 
187. Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1). 
188. Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(i). 
189. Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(ii).  Recording the identification (and non-identification) results 
of the procedure, as well as the identification statement of the eyewitness, is in 
keeping with an approach that “treat[s] eyewitness memory just as carefully 
as . . . other forms of trace evidence, like DNA, bloodstains, or fingerprints, the 
evidentiary value of which can be impaired or destroyed by contamination.”  See 
State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 689 (Or. 2012).  This approach recognizes “the 
original memory as the sole source of evidentiary value in eyewitness 
identifications,” and that “[l]ike those forms of evidence, once contaminated, a 
witness’s original memory is very difficult to retrieve.”  Id.  The statute codifies this 
approach and seeks to record the original identification in its original form and 
preserve that memory like forensic or other evidence which could be corrupted or 
contaminated. 
190. PUB. SAFETY § 3-506.1(f)(1)(iii). 
191. Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(iv). 
192. Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(v). 
193. Id. § 3-506.1(f)(1)(vi). 
194. Id. § 3-506.1(f)(2). 
195. Md. Police & Corr. Training Comm’ns, Eyewitness Identification, MDLE,
 http://mdle.net/resources.htm (follow “Download Eyewitness ID Maryland”; then 
follow “Policy and Forms”; and then follow “Eyewitness Identification Policy 
(2012)”) (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Policy]. 
196. Id.  
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. (“If practicable, the officer should record the procedure and the witness’ 
statement of certainty.  If not, the officer should write down the witness’ exact words 
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Likewise, the model policy is very similar to the statutory policy 
regarding the administration of a photographic identification 
procedure.  The policy states “[e]yewitnesses will be given specific 
instructions prior to being shown a suspect”200 and has a specified set 
of pre-identification instructions that are to be read prior to a show-
up, lineup, or photographic array procedure.201 The model policy 
similarly requires at least five fillers in each photographic array202 
and requires that they match the description of the offender,203 not 
the suspect.204  The policy requires that the suspect’s photograph 
should not stand out from the others.205  The policy also requires (1) 
“changing the order of the photos” when the array is presented to 
another witness,206 (2) that separate arrays must be used for each 
witness,207 and (3) when showing an array containing a new suspect, 
to avoid any fillers from the prior array.208  
Officers are to record the identification procedure,209 “[a]llow each 
witness to view the photographs independently out of the 
presence . . . of the other witnesses,”210 and “[n]ever make 
suggestive statements that may influence the judgment or perception 
 
and incorporate them into his/her report.  The witness should be asked to initial and 
date the front of the photograph selected.”).  The Policy also requires: 
A report of every show-up, photo array, line-up or voice 
identification procedure, whether an identification is made or not, 
shall be submitted.  The report shall include a summary of the 
procedure, the persons who were present for it, instructions given 
to the witness by the officer (this should be accomplished by 
submitting the appropriate witness instruction form), any 
statement or reaction by the witness, and any comments made by 






204. Id.  Specifically, the policy encourages officer to “[a]void fillers who so closely 
match the suspect that a person familiar with the suspect would have difficulty 
distinguishing the filler.”  Id. 
205. Id.  Additionally, officers are encouraged, “[w]ithout altering the photo of the 
suspect,” to “create a consistent appearance between the suspect and the fillers with 
respect to any unique or unusual feature such as facial scars or severe injuries by 




209. Id. (“The photo array should be preserved as evidence in the same configuration as 
when the identification was made.”). 
210. Id. 
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of the witness.”211  The model policy also requires double-blind212 or 
blinded administration of the photographic array,213 as well as 
informing the witness of the fact that the procedure is being 
conducted in a double-blind manner.214  Like the statutory policy, the 
model policy requires an officer to record the witness’s degree of 
confidence.215  
There are some significant features in the model policy that are not 
addressed by the statutory procedures.  For example, the policy urges 
officers to “use caution when interviewing eyewitnesses”216 and to 
“avoid whenever possible the use of leading questions.”217  The 
model policy, unlike the statutory policy, addresses “show-up” 
identifications and notes that such procedures “should only be used 
soon after a crime has been committed, typically within two hours or 
under exigent circumstances, such as the near death of the only 
available witness.”218  The policy states that “show-up” 
identifications should be confined to emergency situations219 and 
should be “as fair and non-suggestive as possible.”220  
 
211. Id. 
212. Id.  The policy states that “[a] second officer who is unaware of which photograph 
depicts the suspect should actually show the photographs” and that this technique “is 
intended to ensure that the witness does not interpret a gesture or facial expression 
by the officer as an indication as to the identity of the suspect.”  Id. 
213. Id.  The policy also iterates that “[i]f a second officer is not available, the officer 
showing the array must employ a so-called “blinded’ technique so that he/she does 
not know when the witness is viewing a photograph of the suspect.”  Id. 
214. Id. (“[O]fficers should explain to the witness that the officer showing the array does 
not know the identity of the people in the photographs.  The investigating officer 




218. Id.  The policy further notes that “[s]how-ups should be conducted live whenever 
possible and not photographically.”  Id. 
219. Id. (“When a show-up is arranged in an emergency situation, where either a witness 
or a victim is in imminent danger of death or in critical condition in a hospital, and 
the circumstances are such that an immediate confrontation is imperative, the 
emergency identification procedure shall be conducted in a non-suggestive 
manner.”).   
220. Id. (“ Every show-up must be as fair and non-suggestive as possible.  Specifically, if 
the suspect is handcuffed, he/she should be positioned so that the handcuffs are not 
visible to the witness.  The suspect should not be viewed when he/she is inside a 
police vehicle, in a cell, or in jail clothing.”).  The policy further urges that “[p]olice 
officers must not do or say anything that might convey to the witnesses that they 
have evidence of the suspect’s guilt.  Officers should turn down their radios so that 
the witness they are transporting does not pick up information about the stop of the 
suspect.”  Id. 
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With regard to the photographic identification procedure, the 
model policy requires sequential administration of the 
photographs.221  If the witness fails to make an identification when 
first shown the array, “but asks to view the array a second time,” the 
policy requires the administrator to “ask the witness if he/she was 
able to make an identification from the original viewing.”222  Only if 
the witness “feels that it would be helpful to repeat the procedure” is 
it permissible to show the array a second time.223  An array may not 
be shown to the witness more than twice.224  
The model policy also has provisions on procedures outside the 
scope of this article, including (1) voice identifications;225 (2) 
courtroom identifications;226 (3) the use of composite sketches;227 
and (4) the use of “mug files” or “mug books.”228  
 IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE 
REFORMS TO EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
PROCEDURES 
What is notably lacking from the statute—and what animates the 
remainder of this article—is the lack of any enforcement mechanism.  
Although some remedies were proposed in earlier versions of the 
statute,229 the enacted statute has no enforcement mechanism or 
sanction for non-compliance.  This is significant because the 
violation of a statute, standing alone, is not grounds for 
 
221. Id.  Specifically, “[t]he officer should show the photographs to a witness one at a 
time.  When the witness signals for the next photograph, the officer should move the 
first photograph so that it is out of sight.  This procedure should be repeated until the 








229. The first reading of the statute provided that evidence of the failure to comply with 
the statute was to be considered by a court in adjudicating a motion to suppress the 
identification; that evidence of the failure to comply with the statute was admissible 
to support a claim of eyewitness misidentification; and that if evidence of non-
compliance was presented at trial, the “jury shall be instructed that the jury may 
consider credible evidence of noncompliance in determining the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification.”  MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION – PROCEDURES, H.B. 1200, 434th Sess., at 3 
(2014).  This provision was stricken from the statute by the Third Reading.  MD. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY, PUBLIC SAFETY – EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION – PROCEDURES, H.B. 
1200, 434th Sess., at 3 (2014).  
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suppression.230  Therefore, while the legislature has required a 
significant number of procedures that have been shown to produce 
more reliable eyewitness identifications, litigants must explore how 
best to enforce, and respond to a violation of, the provisions of this 
statute.  
The remainder of this article explores the remedies and litigation 
strategies that should be available to a criminal defendant who shows 
that law enforcement officers failed to comply with the legislatively 
required procedures for creating and administering an extrajudicial 
identification procedure.  Each remedy explored below is premised 
upon proof of law enforcement non-compliance of the statute.  Every 
remedy suggested below is short of the remedy of total suppression, 
which occurs if a defendant can show that the procedure violated the 
federal due process protections against an unnecessarily suggestive 
procedure which produced an unreliable identification.  
Specifically, this article argues that current Maryland law should 
permit a defendant who shows that law enforcement officers failed 
to comply with the statutorily required procedures for an 
extrajudicial identification: (1) to move in limine to exclude the 
identification on evidentiary grounds.  Current Maryland law should 
also permit the defendant to: (2) cross-examine law enforcement 
officers concerning the failure to employ the procedures required by 
statute; (3) introduce expert testimony informing the jury why the 
procedures required by statute should be employed and how the 
failure to employ those procedures may affect the reliability of a 
resulting identification; (4) request a jury instruction informing the 
jury that certain procedures are required by law and that the jury may 
consider the failure to employ those procedures in assessing the 
weight to give to an identification; and (5) argue to the jury that the 
 
230. Maryland courts have been clear:  
 “One may not wish an exclusionary rule into being by waiving a 
magic wand.  It is something that must be deliberately and 
explicitly created to cover a given type of violation.”  
Accordingly, where the Legislature does not provide explicitly for 
a suppression remedy, courts generally should not read one into 
the statute. 
 King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035, 1047 (Md. 2013) (citation omitted) (quoting Sun Kin 
Chan v. State, 552 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)); Upshur v. State, 56 
A.3d 620, 629 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (noting that a court “will not create a 
suppression remedy . . . where the legislature did not create one at the time it enacted 
the statute”).  It therefore seems apparent that suppression of an identification is not 
an available remedy if a law enforcement agency fails to adopt a policy in keeping 
with the legislative mandate, or if an individual identification procedure fails to 
comply with an extant or required policy.  
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failure to employ the procedures required by statute render the 
identification unreliable.  
It must be noted that none of these remedies exist in a vacuum, and 
none should be considered independently of the others.  To the 
contrary, there is a symbiotic relationship between several of these 
remedies, and the exploration of one remedy may be necessary to the 
provision of another.  For example, cross-examination of a law 
enforcement officer and the testimony of an expert witness may be 
needed to establish the requisite factual basis for a jury instruction 
and closing argument.  A jury instruction may be necessary to lend 
additional (and needed) gravitas to closing argument.  These 
proposed remedies should not be viewed as individual remedies 
depending on the nature of the transgression; they should be viewed 
as a package that works together in harmony.  
This article does not suggest that the violation of the statute should 
result in the total exclusion of the identification (except through an 
evidentiary motion in limine).  Rather, between total suppression and 
leaving the defendant bereft of a way to respond to law enforcement 
non-compliance, this article seeks “a middle temperature between 
the two,” viz., specific and focused remedies that respond directly to 
the failure to comply with the statute, evens the adversarial playing 
field once law enforcement secures an identification in violation of 
the statute, and ultimately, induces law enforcement fidelity to the 
General Assembly’s legislative reforms to the area of extrajudicial 
identification procedures.  
A. Reasons for Providing Remedies for the Failure to Comply with 
the Statutorily Mandated Procedures 
The ultimate aim of this article is to ensure that the law 
enforcement community adopts and utilizes the procedures required 
in Maryland by statute.  If an extrajudicial identification procedure 
complies with the statute, this article is of no use and there is no need 
for any remedy; if a defendant shows that police failed to adopt or 
comply with a statutorily required procedure, this article advocates 
for the provision of appropriate trial remedies.  These remedies are 
not to be seen as a windfall for the defendant or a technicality.  
These remedies should be provided to ultimately induce the law 
enforcement community to do what it should: comply with the 
statute.  It is the author’s most profound hope that law enforcement 
will quickly cast this article into obsolescence.  
The reasons why the law enforcement should be induced to 
comply with the statute are manifest.  The General Assembly has 
mandated the use of certain procedures, rooted in the best present 
scientific understandings of human memory, which increase the 
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reliability of an eyewitness identification procedure.  A more reliable 
process produces a more accurate result.  By ensuring compliance 
with these mandated procedures, courts will ensure that only the 
identifications which are the product of a more reliable process are 
submitted to a jury.  Thus, encouraging identifications that have a 
greater measure of reliability and accuracy increases the overall 
reliability of the identifications introduced in Maryland.  This, 
ultimately, increases the likelihood that the true culprit will be 
identified and an innocent individual will not be wrongly identified.  
There are many profound interests involved in endeavoring to 
better secure correct identification of the guilty and avoid the 
wrongful identification of the innocent.  Two tragedies occur when a 
person is wrongly convicted of a crime he or she did not commit.  
The first is the obvious individual tragedy for the wrongly convicted 
individual.231  There could be no greater miscarriage of justice than 
to convict the wrong individual of a serious criminal offense and to 
allow that person to be punished in the true culprit’s stead.   
There is also a profound public interest in preventing wrongful 
convictions.  When a person is wrongly convicted of a crime, the 
true culprit remains free to reoffend.  There is a profound and 
compelling public interest—which should be sought equally by the 
defense, the prosecution, the judiciary, and society at large—in 
ensuring that the real culprit is swiftly brought to justice.  In his 
 
231. Maryland is not immune to the tragic phenomena of wrongful conviction.  Indeed, 
two leading Maryland cases on eyewitness identification issues involved the 
erroneous identification of a person who was later exonerated.  As noted, one of the 
earliest and most influential Maryland cases adopting the federal due process 
approach regarding suppression of extrajudicial identifications was Webster v. State, 
474 A.2d 1305, 1318 (Md. 1984).  Bernard Webster, however, was innocent of that 
crime; he was identified by a rape victim as her assailant; her identification was 
admitted under the present standard; and he was incarcerated for over twenty years 
for a crime he did not commit.  See, e.g., Stephanie Hanes, DNA’s Secrets Set a Man 
Free, BALT. SUN (Mar. 9, 2003), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-
webster030903-story.html; Bernard Webster, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/bernard-webster/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).  
In Bloodsworth v. State, 512 A.2d 1056 (Md. 1986), which was decided two years 
later, the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the jury should be 
allowed to hear expert testimony concerning eyewitness memory, recall, and 
identification.  Bloodsworth was convicted of sexual offenses and murder and 
sentenced to death based on multiple eyewitness identifications.  Id. at 1057, 1065.  
He was exonerated in 1993 based on DNA testing and became the first person in our 
country to be sentenced to death and proven innocent through DNA testing.  See 
Bomas v. State, 987 A.2d 98, 109–10 (Md. 2010); Kirk Bloodsworth, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/kirk-bloodsworth/ (last visited Apr. 
1, 2017).  
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landmark study of the first 250 DNA exonerations, Professor Garrett 
notes that “[i]n 45% of the 250 postconviction DNA exonerations 
(112 cases), the test results identified the culprit.  This most often 
occurred through a ‘cold hit’ or a match in growing law enforcement 
DNA data banks.”232  More importantly:  
Some of these culprits subsequently confessed or pleaded 
guilty.  At least forty of these perpetrators have been 
convicted of crimes that they committed while innocent 
persons were behind bars.  They were convicted of 
approximately fifty-six rapes and nineteen murders after 
innocent people were convicted of their earlier crimes.  The 
perpetrators may have committed many more crimes, but 
were not caught or were not successfully prosecuted.  The 
DNA testing that eventually was done probably prevented 
still more crimes.  As with [one exoneree], had it not been 
for the postconviction DNA testing, these people could have 
continued their crime spree with impunity.  Those cases all 
highlight how important it is for public safety to make sure 
that the right person is convicted.  Wrongful convictions are 
a serious law enforcement problem.233  
Likewise, another commentator has noted:  
The individual and social harms spawned by wrongful 
convictions are undeniable, compound, and severe.  The 
new crimes committed by offenders who have cheated 
justice, and the brutal devastation of the lives of additional 
rounds of victims, are paramount among those harms.  
Everyone loses when criminal justice miscarries; everyone, 
that is, except the murderers, rapists, burglars, robbers, and 
other lawbreakers who remain at liberty, often to reoffend, 
while the innocent are punished in their stead.234 
Again, the Maryland experience has shown that this is a palpable 
concern.235  
 
232. GARRETT, supra note 82, at 5. 
233. Id. at 232 (footnote omitted). 
234. James R. Acker, The Flipside Injustice of Wrongful Convictions: When the Guilty 
Go Free, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1629, 1709 (2012). 
235. For example, Kirk Bloodsworth was not fully exonerated until DNA testing later 
identified the person who committed the murder and sexual assault for which 
Bloodsworth had been convicted twice; that man pled guilty to the offenses.  See 
Stephanie Hanes, Guilty Plea Closes ‘84 Case of Rosedale Girl’s Murder, BALT. 
SUN (May 21, 2004), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-05-
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 A wrongful conviction is anathema to our system of justice and, 
more importantly, when an innocent person is incorrectly identified 
as the criminal actor the true culprit is left free to reoffend.  By 
encouraging the law enforcement community to adopt procedures 
that increase the reliability and accuracy of extrajudicial 
identification procedures and ensuring that identifications with 
increased reliability are presented to the jury, our system can best 
promote avoiding an individual wrongful conviction and the 
profound societal effect of permitting the true culprit to remain free.  
B. Proposed Remedies for the Failure to Utilize Statutorily 
Required Procedures for Extrajudicial Identification Procedures 
 1.   Motion in Limine to Exclude Identification 
In Perry, the Supreme Court refused to modify its extant due 
process check on the admissibility of extrajudicial identification 
procedures, noting “other safeguards built into our adversary system 
that caution juries against placing undue weight on eyewitness 
testimony of questionable reliability.”236  One of the safeguards 
noted by the Court was for litigants to rely upon traditional rules of 
evidence, which “permit trial judges to exclude relevant evidence if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
impact or potential for misleading the jury.”237  
This approach was adopted in Oregon in State v. Lawson.  In 
Lawson, the Oregon Supreme Court noted the “estimator” and 
“system” variables identified in the scientific literature pertaining to 
eyewitness memory and identification.238  The court placed the onus 
 
21/news/0405210277_1_ruffner-dawn-hamilton-bloodsworth; Susan Levine, Ex-
Death Row Inmate Hears Hoped-for Words: We Found 
Killer, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2003), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/09/06/ex-death-row-inmate-
hears-hoped-for-words-we-found-killer/830ae600-0599-4e7a-a51b-
d461885be769/?utm_term=.f66e19c33432.  The culprit was identified after DNA 
from this offense was matched to his in a database of offenders.  The true culprit had 
been convicted of attempting to rape a woman at knifepoint, which was after the 
offense for which Bloodsworth had been wrongly convicted.  See Stephanie Hanes, 
’84 Investigation Quick to Overlook the Culprit, BALT. SUN (May 22, 2004),  
 http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-05-22/news/0405220166_1_ruffner-dawn-
hamilton-bloodsworth. 
236. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012). 
237. Id. at 247. 
238. See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 686–88 (Or. 2012) (providing an overview of 
system and estimator variables).  The Lawson court identifies “system variables” as: 
(1) blind administration; (2) pre-identification instructions; (3) lineup construction; 
(4) simultaneous versus sequential lineups; (5) show-ups; (6) multiple viewings; (7) 
 
434 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
on the proponent of the identification239—inevitably the prosecution 
—to make a prima facie showing of “evidence showing both that the 
witness had an adequate opportunity to observe or otherwise 
personally perceive the facts to which the witness will testify, and 
did, in fact, observe or perceive them, thereby gaining personal 
knowledge of the facts.”240  The court ultimately considered an 
identification to be a lay opinion (viz., “that a defendant on trial is 
the same person that the witness saw at the scene”241) and 
emphasized that, like any opinion offered into evidence, it must have 
a sufficient factual basis.242  Under the Lawson approach, “[h]uman 
facial features will ordinarily be sufficiently distinctive to serve as a 
rational basis for an inference of identification,” but “nonfacial 
features like race, height, weight, clothing, or hair color, generally 
lack the level of distinction necessary to permit the witness to 
identify a specific person as the person whom the witness saw.”243  
The court also acknowledged that when the witness’s personal 
knowledge is derived from an impermissible source, such as a 
suggestive police procedure, the proponent of the identification must 
show that the identification is based upon a permissible source (i.e., 
the witness’s observations at the scene), rather than the 
impermissible source of knowledge.244  Finally, the proponent must 
establish that the identification is helpful.245  
 
suggestive questioning, co-witness contamination, and other sources of memory 
contamination; and (8) suggestive feedback and recording confidence.  Id. at 686–
87.  The court also identifies “estimator variables” as: (1) stress; (2) witness 
attention; (3) duration of exposure; (4) environmental viewing conditions; (5) 
witness characteristics and condition; (6) description; (7) perpetrator characteristics; 
(8) speed of identification; (9) level of certainty; and (10) memory decay.  Id. at 
687–88. 
239. Id. at 689. 
240. Id. at 692. 
241. Id. 
242. See id. at 693 (requiring a reviewing court to “initially consider what the witness 
actually perceived . . . and then determine whether the witness’s identification of the 
defendant was ‘rationally based’ on those perceptions”).  
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id.  The court “anticipate[d] that that burden will be easily satisfied in nearly all 
cases,” but noted at least a hypothetical example of when the opinion might not help 
the jury in its task.  Id. at 693–94 (“Consider, for example, the witness who observes 
a masked perpetrator with prominently scarred or tattooed hands.  Although those 
features could be distinctive enough to provide a rational basis for an inference of 
identification, a jury may be equally capable of making the same inference by 
comparing the witness’s description of those markings to objective evidence of the 
actual markings on the defendant.  In such cases, the witness’s opinion that 
defendant is the perpetrator provides the jury with little, if any, additional useful 
information.”).  
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Once the proponent shows that the identification is based upon a 
sufficient and permissible factual basis, the Lawson approach 
requires a court to review the probity of the identification against its 
relative dangers.  In the first step of the analysis, the court observed 
that “[t]he persuasive force of eyewitness identification testimony is 
directly linked to its reliability. . . . Conversely, the less reliable a 
witness’s testimony, the less persuasive it will be.”246  This approach 
requires a court to “examine the relative reliability of evidence 
produced by the parties to determine the probative value of the 
identification,” recognizing that “[t]he more factors—the presence of 
system variables alone or in combination with estimator variables—
that weigh against reliability of the identification, the less persuasive 
the identification evidence will be to prove the fact of identification, 
and correspondingly, the less probative value that identification will 
have.”247  In this initial step, all the proponent must show is that the 
identification has probative value, and the court recognized there is a 
wide range of probity and “many identifications possessing 
relatively low probative value may still pass that initial test.”248 
Once a reviewing court assesses the probity of the identification, 
“[it] must then determine whether the evidence might unfairly 
prejudice the defendant.”249  The court should be cognizant that “in 
cases in which an eyewitness has been exposed to suggestive police 
procedures, trial courts have a heightened role as an evidentiary 
gatekeeper because ‘traditional’ methods of testing reliability—like 
cross-examination—can be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or 
inaccurate eyewitness identification evidence.”250  The court may 
exclude the identification in toto and may also “exclude particularly 
prejudicial aspects of a witness’s testimony without excluding the 
identification itself” or exclude certain prejudicial aspects of the 
testimony without excluding the testimony completely.251  
Oregon seems to be the only jurisdiction that has utilized state law 
to fashion a test for excluding an identification on evidentiary 
grounds.  Maryland practitioners should, therefore, know they sail 
uncharted waters in filing a motion in limine to exclude an 
eyewitness identification under the Lawson approach.  In 
undertaking this voyage, however, practitioners should note the 
 




250. Id. at 695. 
251. Id. 
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similarities between Maryland and Oregon evidentiary principles.  
Maryland, like Oregon, requires a showing that the witness’s 
testimony is based on personal knowledge252 and requires a showing 
that there is a sufficient factual basis for any opinion testimony.253  
Lawson ultimately rests upon an assessment of the relative probative 
value of the identification weighed against the potential prejudice in 
admitting the testimony.  In this evaluation, the same rules that 
allowed the Lawson court to undertake this analysis are identical to 
the Maryland Rules that guide a Maryland court in undertaking an 
analysis of whether the identification should be admitted into 
evidence.254  
 
252. See MD. RULE 5-602 (noting “a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is 
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of 
the matter”).  
253. In Maryland, the proponent of opinion testimony must demonstrate a sufficient 
factual basis for the opinion.  Without a factual basis, the opinion is nothing more 
than inadmissible conjecture and speculation.  Uhlik v. Kopec, 314 A.2d 732, 737 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).  This issue usually arises with regard to expert opinions, 
and in that regard,“[a]n expert’s judgment has no probative force unless there is a 
sufficient basis upon which to support his [or her] conclusions.”  Worthington 
Constr. Corp. v. Moore, 291 A.2d 466, 470–71 (Md. 1972); Surkovich v. Doub, 265 
A.2d 447, 451 (Md. 1970) (noting “an expert’s opinion is of no greater probative 
value than the soundness of his reasons given therefore will warrant”); see also State 
Health Dep’t v. Walker, 209 A.2d 555, 559 (Md. 1965) (explaining how the record 
“must disclose that the expert is sufficiently familiar with the subject matter under 
investigation to elevate his opinion above the realm of conjecture and speculation, 
for no matter how highly qualified the expert may be in his field, his opinion has no 
probative force unless a sufficient factual basis to support a rational conclusion is 
shown”); 6 LYNN MCCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 705.1 (2015) (requiring “the 
opinion [to] ha[ve] a sufficient basis for it to be considered by the fact-finder”). 
254. The definition of relevance which guides the court’s assessment of probity is the 
same in Oregon and Maryland.  Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 40.150 (2015) 
(“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”), with MD. RULE 5-401 
(“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).  Once the court determines 
the probative value of the identification, the assessment of probity versus prejudice is 
likewise identical in both states (except that, in Maryland, evidence may be excluded 
if it is a “waste of time”).  Compare OR. R. EVID. 403 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 
40.160 (2015)) (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”), with MD. RULE 5-403 (“Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.”).  
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Thus, Maryland law would seem to support filing a motion in 
limine, raising the arguments identified in Lawson, to exclude an 
identification on evidentiary grounds.  Indeed, this appears to be the 
best way to engraft “system” and “estimator” variables into 
Maryland law.  Under this approach, the focus is not on the 
suggestiveness, but on the overall reliability of the procedure and 
resulting identification.  Counsel should note that, of all the remedies 
suggested in this article, this approach has the least likelihood of 
success, mostly because (to the author’s knowledge) this approach 
has never been tried in Maryland.  Nevertheless, should an 
identification raise legitimate concerns as to its reliability, and 
present pertinent system and estimator variables, counsel should 
endeavor to have the identification excluded on evidentiary grounds.   
 2.   Cross-Examination of the Law Enforcement Officers Who 
Created and Administered the Procedure.  
The most immediate form of defense is to permit cross-
examination of law enforcement officers concerning the failure to 
comply with the legislatively mandated procedures for conducting an 
extrajudicial identification procedure.  The defendant should also be 
allowed to examine the officers who created and administered the 
extrajudicial identification procedure to establish a necessary factual 
basis for the other remedies suggested by this article.  
In Maryland, unless it is otherwise excluded, “all relevant evidence 
is admissible.”255  Relevant evidence is “any evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.”256  The fact that a person identified 
the defendant in an extrajudicial identification procedure is evidence 
that the person is the person who committed the offense.  If police 
failed to utilize more reliable procedures that produce more reliable 
identifications, the resulting identification is—or, could be found by 
the jury to be—less reliable.  This, therefore, makes the failure to 
utilize the statutory procedures relevant because it affects the relative 
weight the jury should afford to an identification that was procured 
in an extrajudicial identification procedure that did not comply with 
the statutory requirements.  Given that this evidence would impact 
the relative weight of the State’s case, vis-à-vis criminal agency, it is 
a proper area to explore in cross-examination.  
 
255. MD. RULE 5-402. 
256. MD. RULE 5-401.  
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The practitioner should note that this should be an area of 
exploration in cross-examining a law enforcement officer who 
conducted an extrajudicial identification procedure because several 
other remedies, such as jury instructions and argument, require a 
factual basis, and this is likely the best area to obtain the facts 
necessary for an argument or instruction.  Proper cross-examination 
should go towards showing that the officer did not comply with 
relevant and specific aspects of the statutory requirements.257  
Counsel should also inquire as to whether the officer’s agency has a 
written policy concerning extrajudicial identification procedures, 
whether the terms of that policy comply with the statutory mandates 
and, if so, why the officer did not comply with that policy.258  
 3.   Expert Testimony Concerning the Relative Reliability of the 
Identification 
In Perry, the Supreme Court refused to depart from the present due 
process check upon eyewitness identification testimony, noting that 
jurors may be educated concerning the reliability of those 
identifications via expert testimony “on the hazards of eyewitness 
identification evidence.”259  While expert testimony on eyewitness 
memory and identification is now admissible in most jurisdictions—
including Maryland—the need for such testimony in a Maryland trial 
is even stronger, given that an expert may educate the jury as to: (a) 
why the legislature would require certain procedures in the 
composition and administration of an extrajudicial identification 
procedure; and (b) how the failure to utilize those procedures in a 
 
257. For example, the statute requires an identification procedure to be conducted by a 
“blind” or “blinded” administrator, (i.e., an administrator who “does not know the 
identity of the suspect” or an administrator who “may know who the suspect is but 
does not know which lineup member is being viewed by the eyewitness”).  MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-506.1(a)(3)–(4), (b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016).  A 
relevant line of inquiry would be: “Officer, when you administered the photographic 
array, you knew that Mr. Defendant was the suspect, correct?  And you knew that he 
was in position four in the array, correct?” 
258. Admittedly, the latter lines of questioning may be less relevant than questioning 
establishing compliance vel non with the statutorily required procedures.  However, 
at some point, the jury will need to know the relative importance of the failure to 
undertake certain procedures, such as blind or blinded administration of the array.  
The importance, of course, is that law enforcement agencies are required by statute 
to adopt these procedures because they produce more reliable identifications.  
Adequately informing the jury of these requirements and their importance—via a 
jury instruction or in some other meaningful way—may obviate the need for these 
questions in cross-examination, as long as the jury is ultimately informed that 
Maryland law requires law enforcement agencies to adopt, and employ, these 
required procedures. 
259. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 247 (2012).  
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particular array affects the relative reliability of the resulting 
identification.  Where law enforcement agencies or individual 
officers fail to comply with the legislatively required procedures, a 
defendant should be allowed to adduce expert testimony informing 
the jury how the failure to comply with those policies affects the 
weight of the identification.  
In Bomas v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals “recognize[d] 
that scientific advances . . . may assist juries in evaluating 
eyewitness testimony” and “appreciate[d] that scientific advances 
have revealed (and may continue to reveal) a novel or greater 
understanding of the mechanics of memory that may not be intuitive 
to a layperson.”260  The Court also “ma[d]e clear that trial courts 
should recognize these scientific advances in exercising their 
discretion whether to admit such expert testimony in a particular 
case.”261  In so doing, the Court embraced “a flexible standard that 
can properly gauge the state of the scientific art in relation to the 
specific facts of the case.”262  Ultimately, the Court reiterated that the 
proper test for the admissibility of expert testimony is the 
discretionary consideration of “whether [the expert’s] testimony will 
be of real appreciable help to the trier of fact in deciding the issue 
 
260. 987 A.2d 98, 112 (Md. 2010).  The Court also noted that Bloodsworth v. State, 512 
A.2d 1056 (Md. 1986)—its only prior consideration of the propriety of expert 
testimony on eyewitness memory and identification—“strikes a negative tone with 
respect to expert testimony on eyewitness identification.”  Id. at 108.  In 
Bloodsworth, the Maryland Court of Appeals had noted that, as of that time, “[t]he 
vast majority of courts have rejected” expert testimony on eyewitness identification, 
512 A.2d at 1064, and emphasized “[o]ur legal system places primary reliance for 
the ascertainments of truth on the test of cross-examination,” and “[i]t is the 
responsibility of counsel during cross-examination to inquire into whether the 
witness’ opportunity for observation, his capacity for observation, his attention and 
interest and his distraction or division of attention.”  Id. at 1065 (quoting United 
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973)).  The Bloodsworth Court also 
noted such testimony “would effectively invade the province of the jury” and “open 
a floodgate whereby experts would testify on every conceivable aspect of a witness’ 
credibility.”  Id. (quoting State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (R.I. 1979)).  While 
the Bomas Court did not change the test for the admissibility of such testimony, it 
retracted the Court’s prior negative attitude towards the admission of this testimony.  
261. Bomas, 987 A.2d at 112.  The Court also noted the prevalence of wrongful 
convictions based on incorrect eyewitness identification, id. at 109, and that it was 
“sensitive to the perils of such testimony” and concluded by “reiterat[ing] that trial 
courts, in considering the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
observation and memory, should recognize scientific advances that have led to a 
greater understanding of the mechanics of memory that may not be intuitive to a 
layperson.”  Id. at 116.   
262. Id. at 112. 
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presented.”263  While noting that other remedies may be available to 
the defendant,264 the Court iterated that “the probative value of 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification and how much such 
testimony can actually help the jury in the case before it must be 
carefully weighed by the court on a case-by-case basis.”265  
The Court also observed that “[a] trial judge must have the ability 
to determine whether proffered testimony has a credible foundation 
and is relevant to the facts of a given case”266 and must evaluate 
whether the proffered expert testimony is relevant to the case at 
hand.267  In Bomas, the Court ultimately affirmed the exclusion of 
expert testimony, which was general, vague, and lacked a sufficient 
factual basis.268  
Consistent with Bomas’ “flexible standard that can properly gauge 
the state of the scientific art in relation to the specific facts of the 
case,”269 when the defendant shows that law enforcement officers 
who administered an extrajudicial identification procedure failed to 
comply with a certain component of the statutorily required 
procedures, the defendant should be permitted to adduce expert 
testimony educating the jury as to how that particular procedure 
increases the reliability of an identification, and thus, how the failure 
to employ that required procedure affects the identification at hand.  
For example, if a defendant shows that the officer who administered 
the procedure was neither blind nor blinded, the defendant should be 
able to introduce the testimony of an expert who can educate jurors 
as to why a procedure should be conducted in a blind or blinded 
manner and the impact that non-blinded administration has upon the 
ultimate reliability of the identification.  
The use of expert testimony in this arena may ultimately 
synthesize several pertinent considerations.  Maryland law 
recognizes the scientific advances concerning eyewitness memory 
 
263. Id. at 106 (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth, 512 A.2d at 1066). 
264. The Court noted that “[e]xpert testimony is not the only means to educate juries 
about the vagaries of eyewitness testimonies and safeguard against wrongful 
convictions based on misidentifications.”  Id.  The Court observed “other trial 
components such as cross-examination, closing arguments, and jury instructions, can 
provide the jury with sufficient information to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications.”  Id.  To this end, the Court iterated that it may be appropriate for the 
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee “to evaluate whether its 
current rule on witnesses . . . should be modified in light of the studies about 
eyewitness testimony, and the scientific advances in this area.”  Id. 
265. Id. at 114. 
266. Id. at 113. 
267. Id. at 112–13. 
268. Id. at 114. 
269. Id. at 112. 
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and identification in the past several decades and supports the 
admission of expert testimony on that topic, provided that the 
testimony is helpful to the jury and pertinent to the facts at hand.270  
The Maryland General Assembly, based upon that increased 
scientific understanding, has required a series of procedures that will 
help produce more reliable extrajudicial identifications.271  When the 
defendant shows that law enforcement failed to comply with those 
required procedures, an expert can provide the necessary 
understanding as to why those procedures are required and why the 
failure to employ those procedures impacts the weight the jury 
should give to the resulting identification.  This approach will thus 
bring harmony between the admission of expert testimony 
concerning a relevant aspect of the identification at issue and the 
General Assembly’s requirement of specific procedures in creating 
and administering an extrajudicial identification procedure.  
Additionally, the testimony of an expert may provide the necessary 
factual basis for a jury instruction concerning the required 
procedures and the weight the jury should give to an identification 
where the procedure does not comply with those procedures, as well 
as any closing argument to that effect.  Again, should law 
enforcement comply with the statutorily required procedures and 
employ these more reliable methods for creating and administering 
extrajudicial identification procedures, expert testimony on the need 
for such procedures would be unwarranted and not helpful to the 
jury.  Conversely, should law enforcement officers fail to employ 
those procedures, expert testimony is an excellent way to educate 
jurors as to the importance of those procedures in assessing the 
evidence in the case.  Thus, if law enforcement fails to comply with 
the statutorily mandated procedures, a defendant should be permitted 
to introduce expert testimony concerning the need for the procedures 
that law enforcement did not employ and the weight to afford to a 
non-compliant identification.  
 4.   Jury Instructions 
 In Perry, the Supreme Court noted that unreliable identifications 
may be countered by the “existing safeguards” in the trial process, 
including jury instructions that “warn the jury to take care in 
 
270. Id. at 112, 116. 
271. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-506.1(b)–(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016). 
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appraising identification evidence.”272  The Maryland Court of 
Appeals has likewise noted that it may be appropriate for the 
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee “to evaluate 
whether its current rule on witnesses . . . should be modified in light 
of the studies about eyewitness testimony, and the scientific 
advances in this area.”273  Several states have recently adopted 
pattern jury instructions reflecting present scientific understandings 
of memory and identification,274 or tasked various committees with 
adopting pattern jury instructions on that topic.275  Indeed, jury 
instructions appear to be one of the core areas of eyewitness reform, 
and commentators have argued that comprehensive jury instructions 
on the science of eyewitness memory and identification may be the 
“most effective” way to educate jurors as to the dangers of 
eyewitness testimony.276  
 The need for, and efficacy of, pattern instructions on general issues 
concerning eyewitness memory and identification is outside the 
scope of this article.  This article concerns potential defenses that can 
be asserted once a criminal defendant shows that he or she was 
identified in an extrajudicial identification procedure that did not 
comply with the procedures required by statute.  Should the 
defendant show that law enforcement officers failed to comply with 
the statute, the defendant should be entitled to a focused instruction 
informing jurors as to what procedures are required by Maryland law 
and that the failure to comply with the statute may be considered in 
evaluating the weight of the resulting identification.  
 In Maryland, a jury instruction is appropriate if: it is a correct 
statement of the law; it is applicable to the facts of the case; and it 
relates to content not “fairly covered” elsewhere in the 
instructions.277  While a trial judge has discretion in formulating an 
appropriate instruction and in deciding whether to give an 
instruction, the Court of Appeals will reverse the trial court’s 
 
272. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 246 (2012) (citing United States v. Telfaire, 
469 F.2d 552, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam)).  
273. Bomas, 987 A.2d at 113. 
274. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 918 (Mass. 2015). 
275. See, e.g., Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 427 (Alaska 2016); State v. Cabagbag, 277 
P.3d 1027, 1039 (Haw. 2012). 
276. See Derek Simmonsen, Teach Your Jurors Well: Using Jury Instructions to Educate 
Jurors About Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 MD. L. 
REV. 1044, 1047 (2011). 
277. See Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 189–90 (Md. 2010); Dickey v. State, 946 A.2d 444, 
450 (Md. 2008) (quoting MD. RULE 4-325). 
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decision not to propound an instruction if it finds that the defendant’s 
rights were not adequately protected.278  
 Maryland appellate courts have, on several occasions, indicated 
that instructions on eyewitness identification issues may be 
appropriate.  In Gunning v. State,279 which considered two 
consolidated cases that had been tried separately before the same 
judge, counsel for each defendant requested the court to propound 
the pattern instruction concerning eyewitness identification, and in 
both trials, the judge refused to propound the requested 
instruction.280  The Maryland Court of Appeals held that a court has 
discretion to consider whether to propound an instruction on 
eyewitness testimony,281 and in exercising this discretion, the court 
should analyze whether the evidence at trial gives rise to a need for 
such an instruction by considering “such factors as any equivocation 
associated with the identification, the extent to which mistaken 
identification is reasonably at issue and the existence of, or lack of 
corroboration of the eyewitness identification.”282  The Court also 
rejected the contention that an instruction on the manner in which the 
jury should evaluate an eyewitness identification went beyond the 
court’s duty to instruct the jury as to the law and that it did not 
constitute an impermissible comment upon the evidence.283  Finally, 
the Court indicated that an instruction on eyewitness testimony 
might assist the jury in its task by “pointing out the specific factors 
that may affect eyewitness identification,” which might not be 
generally known by jurors.284  Thus, the Court required a trial court 
to give “careful consideration” to a request for a jury instruction on 
eyewitness testimony when uncorroborated eyewitness testimony 
was a critical aspect of the State’s case.285  
 In Janey v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
reaffirmed this discretionary approach in considering whether the 
trial court erred in failing to propound an instruction concerning 
cross-racial identification.286  After reviewing Gunning and 
discussing existing law, which stated that a trial court need not 
 
278. See Cost, 10 A.3d at 189 (citing General v. State, 789 A.2d 102, 111 (Md. 2002)). 
279. Gunning v. State, 701 A.2d 374 (Md. 1997). 
280. Id. at 375–77. 
281. Id. at 380–81. 
282. Id. at 382. 
283. Id. at 381. 
284. Id. at 383. 
285. Id. at 384–85. 
286. 891 A.2d 355, 356 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006). 
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instruct the jury on factual (versus legal) inferences,287 the court 
concluded “[i]t is clear . . . that an instruction that cautions the jury 
about pertinent factors that can affect the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications in general may be appropriate.”288  The court 
ultimately held that there was no reversible error in refusing to 
propound the instruction in that case because, under the facts of the 
case, the requested instruction would not have significantly 
influenced the outcome of the case.289  However, the court indicated 
that it did not intend to foreclose such an instruction in a more 
appropriate case.290  
 Outside of the eyewitness arena, Maryland law holds that it is 
sometimes appropriate to instruct the jury as to factual inferences 
that may arise from law enforcement missteps in the investigation of 
a case.  For example, in Cost v. State, the defendant was accused of 
assaulting another inmate at a correctional institution and, at trial, 
established that although the scene of the attack had initially been 
preserved, the contents of the cell in question had been destroyed 
before the scene could be appropriately investigated.291  The 
defendant requested that the jury be instructed that the destruction of 
this evidence could lead to an inference that the evidence was 
favorable to the defendant.292  The Court ultimately agreed, noting 
that the case presented an unusual circumstance in which “[t]he 
evidence destroyed while in State custody was highly relevant to 
[the] case,” and that evidence went “to the heart of the case.”293  In 
those circumstances, the Court iterated that an instruction “which 
would permit but not demand that the jury draw an inference that the 
missing evidence would be unfavorable to the State, should have 
been given.”294  The Court also noted that, although Cost could have 
argued for the jury to draw the same inference, an instruction was 
warranted because “argument by counsel to the jury will naturally be 
imbued with a greater gravitas when it is supported by a[n] 
instruction on the same point issued from the bench.”295  Last, the 
 
287. See id. at 361–62 (discussing Patterson v. State, 741 A.2d 1119, 1124–25 (Md. 
1999)). 
288. Id. at 362. 
289. Id. at 367–68. 
290. Id. 
291. 10 A.3d 184, 187–88 (Md. 2010). 
292. Id. at 188. 
293. Id. at 196. 
294. Id. 
295. Id.  The Court further iterated, “As we have previously said, ‘a statement or 
instruction by the trial judge carries with it the imprimatur of a judge learned in the 
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Court observed that “[f]or the judicial system to function fairly, one 
party in a case cannot be permitted to gain an unfair advantage 
through destruction of evidence,” and thus, a jury instruction on the 
jury’s ability to draw an inference would “help ensure that the 
interests of justice are protected.”296  
 Cost involved the situation where an instruction was necessary to 
level the playing field and preclude one party from gaining a 
litigation advantage by destroying relevant evidence.  Conversely, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals has held that there is generally no 
obligation to instruct the jury as to the situations in which law 
enforcement has no duty to undertake certain actions during a 
criminal investigation.  In a series of cases addressing the so-called 
“CSI-effect,”297 the Court of Appeals has cautioned judges to tread 
carefully in propounding jury instructions concerning the absence of 
a legal duty of police to undertake certain steps in investigating a 
criminal case.  In Atkins v. State,298 the Court held that a trial judge 
abused her discretion in instructing a jury that “there is no legal 
requirement that the State utilize any specific investigative technique 
or scientific test to prove its case”299 because this instruction 
“resulted in a non-neutral commentary on the evidence, or the 
absence of evidence, actually admitted, and invaded the province of 
the jury, thus violating Atkins’s constitutional rights to due process 
and a fair trial.”300  In Stabb v. State,301 the Court again held that such 
an instruction was improper and indicated that such instructions 
should only be given when “it responds to correction of a pre-existing 
overreaching by the defense, i.e., a curative instruction.”302  A 
criminal defendant does not generate such a curative instruction when 
he or she argues that the State has failed to employ “a well-known, 
readily available, and superior method of proof,” such as fingerprint 
 
law, and therefore usually has more force and effect than if merely presented by 
counsel.’”  Id. at 196–97 (quoting Hardison v. State, 172 A.2d 407, 411 (Md. 1961)). 
296. Id. at 197. 
297. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 84 A.3d 69, 80 (Md. 2014) (expressing an “avowed 
skepticism regarding the appropriate use of an ‘anti-CSI effect’ instruction”); Stabb 
v. State, 31 A.3d 922, 930 (Md. 2011) (“The ‘CSI effect’ refers generally to various 
theories that assert that exposure to courtroom or criminal investigative fictional 
media may influence jurors’ objective evaluation of an actual trial.”). 
298. Atkins v. State, 26 A.3d 979 (Md. 2011). 
299. Id. at 983. 
300. Id. at 980. 
301. Stabb, 31 A.3d at 922. 
302. Id. at 933. 
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analysis, to connect the defendant to the crime.303  Thus, Maryland 
law does not allow the court to instruct jurors as to what law 
enforcement officers are not required to do, absent an improper 
defense insinuation that law enforcement failed to perform a requisite 
element of the investigation.  
 Maryland law also recognizes there is no duty for a judge to 
instruct a jury on an “evidentiary inference” that “is not based on a 
legal standard but on individual facts from which inferences can be 
drawn.”304  While there is no requirement for the court to instruct the 
jury on basic evidentiary inferences, there are myriad instances in 
which the jury is instructed as to the requirements of Maryland law 
and permitted to let specific legal considerations conveyed in the 
instruction guide their fact-finding.  For example, Maryland is one of 
a few remaining jurisdictions that permits a person to resist an 
unlawful warrantless arrest.305  Where the defendant is charged with 
resisting arrest and the evidence in a case generates a factual issue as 
to whether police had probable cause to arrest that person, the court 
must propound an instruction concerning the right to resist the arrest 
or, at minimum, concerning the legal requirements for a lawful 
arrest.306  There are numerous instances in which a jury may be 
instructed on issues as diverse as whether the defendant’s destruction 
of evidence307 or bribery of a witness308 shows a consciousness of 
guilt.  In Maryland, a jury is permitted to decide whether a 
defendant’s statement to police is voluntary and is instructed to 
 
303. Robinson v. State, 84 A.3d 69, 81 (Md. 2014); see, e.g., Sample v. State, 550 A.2d 
661, 663 (Md. 1988); Eley v. State, 419 A.2d 384, 386–87 (Md. 1980); see infra 
note 330 and accompanying text. 
304. Patterson v. State, 741 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Md. 1999). 
305. Maryland has long recognized “that one illegally arrested may use any reasonable 
means to effect his escape, even to the extent of using such force as is reasonably 
necessary.”  Sugarman v. State, 195 A. 324, 326 (Md. 1937); see also State v. 
Wiegmann, 714 A.2d 841, 851 (Md. 1998) (declining “to abolish the long-standing 
common law privilege permitting persons to resist an unlawful warrantless arrest”); 
Rodgers v. State, 373 A.2d 944, 947–48 (Md. 1977) (discussing the historical 
underpinnings of the common law right to resist an arrest).  A person may therefore 
offer reasonable resistance to repel an unlawful warrantless arrest.  Dennis v. State, 
674 A.2d 928, 936 (Md. 1996). 
306. See Arthur v. State, 24 A.3d 667, 677 (Md. 2011) (noting that “because the evidence 
presented at trial generated the issue of whether [police] had probable cause to arrest 
Arthur . . . the only way for Arthur to have a fair trial is for the jury to understand the 
law concerning his right to resist an unlawful arrest”). 
307. See MD. STATE BAR STANDING COMM., MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS § 3:26 (2d ed. Supp. 2016). 
308. Id. § 3:28. 
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“consider all the circumstances surrounding the statement,” including 
a list of enumerated circumstances.309  The jury is then left to give the 
statement “such weight as [it] believe it deserves,” if it is voluntary, 
but told that it “must disregard it,” if it finds that the statement was 
not voluntary.310  
 Thus, although Maryland juries should not be instructed as to 
pure factual inferences, Maryland juries are routinely informed of the 
underlying legal principles that will influence their factual findings 
and instructed to use these legal principles in resolving factual 
disputes.  The key, therefore, in requesting a jury instruction 
concerning law enforcement officers’ failure to comply with the 
statutory standards for extrajudicial identification procedures is to tie 
the instruction to the law and to let the legal standards established by 
law guide the jury in assessing the facts of the case.  Under the 
statute, law enforcement agencies are required to adopt and employ a 
set of standards in conducting eyewitness identification 
procedures.311  Unlike the “no duty” situation confronted in Atkins, 
Stabb, and Robinson, law enforcement officers are under a legal duty 
to adopt and implement these procedures.  Moreover, as Cost noted, 
“[f]or the judicial system to function fairly, one party in a case cannot 
be permitted to gain an unfair advantage through the destruction of 
evidence,” and therefore, an instruction concerning the inferences 
that arise when a party destroys relevant evidence “help[s] ensure that 
the interests of justice are protected.”312  When a law enforcement 
agency fails to comply with Maryland law and adopt an eyewitness 
identification protocol that complies with the statutory mandate, or 
when individual officers fail to comply with such a protocol, the 
prosecution has gained an unfair advantage by securing the 
identification of the accused in a less-reliable manner than required 
by law.  In such a situation, the only way to restore the parties to 
where they should be is to instruct the jury as to the statutory 
requirements and permit the jury to use statutory non-compliance as a 
factor in evaluating the relative weight to afford to the identification.  
A jury instruction on this topic would therefore inform the jury as 
to the statutory requirements and permit the jury to evaluate whether 
 
309. Id. § 3:18. 
310. Id. 
311. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-506.1(b)–(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016). 
312. Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 197 (Md. 2010). 
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non-compliance with the statute affects the weight given to the 
identification.  The author suggests the following annotated 
instruction as a guide:313 
You have heard evidence that the defendant was identified 
prior to trial from [a lineup] [an array of pictures] shown to 
a witness.  Maryland law requires a certain set of procedures 
to be followed in any procedure in which a witness is asked 
to identify a suspect from [a live lineup] [an array of 
photographs] including [a photograph of] the suspect.314  
You are instructed that: 
 The officer conducting the procedure may not know the 
identity of the suspect or, at minimum, if the officer knows 
the identity of the suspect he or she may not know which 
lineup member is being viewed by the witness;315  
 The witness must be instructed, prior to the administration 
of the procedure, that the perpetrator may or may not be 
among the persons in the procedure;316  
 The officer administering the procedure must document in 
writing all identification statements made by the eyewitness 
at the time of the procedure, and prior to any feedback given 
to the witness, including a statement in the witness’s own 
words describing the witness’s confidence level that the 
person identified is the perpetrator of the crime;317  
 The procedure must include a minimum of [four] [five]318 
other individuals who resemble the description of the 
perpetrator given by the eyewitness in significant physical 
features, including any unique or unusual features;319  
 The array must contain different “fillers” if the witness has 
previously participated in an identification procedure;320  
 
313. This instruction is modeled on the statutory procedure codified in section 3-506.1 of 
the Maryland Public Safety Code.  An instruction may also be modeled on the 
complementary model policy of the Eyewitness Identification Policy.  Policy, supra 
note 195, at 33.  
314. This communicates the essence of the definition of an “identification procedure” in 
section 3-506.1(a)(8) of the Maryland Public Safety Code. 
315. PUB. SAFETY §§ 3-506.1(a)(3)–(4), (b)(1). 
316. Id. § 3-506.1(b)(3). 
317. Id. §§ 3-506.1(a)(9), (b)(4).  
318. Five “fillers” must be used in a photographic array, and four “fillers” must be used 
during an in-person lineup procedure.  Id. §§ 3-506.1(c)(2)–(3). 
319. Id. § 3-506.1(c)(1). 
320. Id. § 3-506.1(d). 
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 If identification procedures are conducted for multiple 
eyewitnesses, the procedure must be conducted separately 
for each witness, the suspect must be placed in a different 
position for each procedure, and the witnesses may not 
communicate with each other until all procedures have been 
completed;321 and 
 At the end of the procedure, police must document the 
procedure via an audio or video recording, or document in 
writing all identification and non-identification results 
obtained from the procedure; the signed identification 
statement of the eyewitness; the names of all persons 
present at the procedure; the date and time of the procedure; 
whether the witness identified a “filler” other than the 
suspect; and retain all photographs used in the procedure.322 
Should you find that the law enforcement officers who 
administered the identification procedure in this case failed 
to comply with any of these requirements, you may consider 
the failure to comply with those requirements in assigning 
the weight to give to the identification secured by that 
procedure.  
Like any other jury instruction, this instruction would have to be 
factually generated by the evidence at trial.323  This, therefore, shows 
the importance of cross-examining the law enforcement officer who 
administered the procedure as to what was done, and what was not 
done, during the procedure.324  This also shows how expert 
testimony, concerning the need for such procedures and how the 
failure to employ these procedures may affect the weight of an 
identification, can help the jury.  This instruction will not be factually 
generated or necessary if the evidence shows that the law 
enforcement agency and the individual officers who administered the 
procedure complied with the statute.  
 The most important reason of why such an instruction may be 
warranted is because absent this instruction, jurors will have no way 
of knowing the pertinent Maryland law concerning the creation and 
administration of extrajudicial identification procedures.  The 
 
321. Id. §§ 3-506.1(e)(1)–(3). 
322. Id. § 3-506.1(f). 
323. See Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 189 (Md. 2010); Dickey v. State, 946 A.2d 444, 450 
(Md. 2008). 
324. See supra Section II.B.2. 
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General Assembly has required these procedures for a reason: to 
create an increase in the overall reliability of eyewitness 
identifications at trial.  When law enforcement agencies or individual 
officers fail to abide by these requirements and submit an 
identification that was not produced by these more reliable 
procedures, a jury should be informed of that statutory violation and 
allowed to utilize the failure to comply with the required procedures 
in evaluating the weight to afford the resulting identification.  The 
provision of such an instruction will therefore induce compliance 
with the statute and equal the adversarial playing field in the wake of 
law enforcement dereliction of their statutory duty to secure 
identifications in the manner proscribed by statute.  
5. Closing Argument  
Perhaps the most modest of the potential remedies that should be 
afforded to a defendant who has been identified in a procedure that 
does not comply with the statutory protocol is to permit robust 
closing argument on law enforcement’s failure to comply with the 
statute.  While this is a modest remedy—and, perhaps, the most non-
controversial remedy proposed by this article—the need for robust 
argument may ultimately highlight the necessity of the other 
remedies suggested in this article. 
In Maryland, “liberal freedom of speech should be allowed”325 in 
closing argument and “attorneys are afforded great leeway in 
presenting closing arguments to the jury.”326  In this vein, Maryland 
permits the defendant to comment upon the failure to employ a more 
sophisticated investigation during closing argument.  For example, in 
Eley v. State, the trial court did not permit the defendant to note in 
closing argument that there was no fingerprint evidence connecting 
him to a vehicle used in a crime.327  The Maryland Court of Appeals 
reversed the conviction, noting that “the excluded comments went to 
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, or more specifically the 
lack of evidence,”328 and also to the weight of the evidence because 
“the State had available to it a better method of identification-
fingerprint evidence” but “failed to produce any such evidence and 
failed to offer any explanation for that failure.”329  Thus, the Court 
 
325. Wilhelm v. State, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (Md. 1974). 
326. Degren v. State, 722 A.2d 887, 901 (Md. 1999). 
327. 419 A.2d 384, 385 (Md. 1980). 
328. Id. at 386–87. 
329. Id. at 387. 
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concluded, “where a better method of identification may be available 
and the State offers no explanation whatsoever for its failure to come 
forward with such evidence, it is not unreasonable to allow the 
defendant to call attention to its failure to do so.”330  
In Eley, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that the defendant 
could comment upon the failure to utilize fingerprint evidence even 
though there was no duty for law enforcement officers to utilize this 
investigative technique.331  Unlike the situation in Eley, law 
enforcement officers are under a statutory duty to utilize certain 
procedures in administering an extrajudicial identification 
procedure.332  If the defendant in the Eley/Sample line of cases may 
comment upon the failure to utilize “a better method of 
identification” that is “available” to investigators, surely a defendant 
identified in an identification procedure that does not comply with the 
statutory guidelines—aimed at increasing the reliability of 
identifications—should be given similar leeway to comment upon the 
State’s failure to utilize a more reliable form of investigation.333 
Maryland decisions permit a defendant to focus on weaknesses in 
eyewitness identifications in closing argument.  In Smith v. State, a 
witness identified a person of a different race as the person who tried 
to rob her at gunpoint.334  The witness also testified that she was 
“extremely good with faces,” “very, very good with people,” and 
“stud[ied] faces and . . . look[ed] for features on people that make 
them more distinct.”335  Prior to closing argument, the trial judge 
informed the parties that “defense counsel will not be able to argue 
on cross-racial identification . . . [because] there is not evidence in 
this case to that effect.”336  On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
reviewed the scientific literature concerning cross-racial 
 
330. Id.; accord Sample v. State, 550 A.2d 661, 663 (Md. 1988) (noting that “when the 
State has failed to utilize a well-known, readily available, and superior method of 
proof to link the defendant with the criminal activity, the defendant ought to be able 
to comment on the absence of such evidence”). 
331. Eley, 419 A.2d at 387 (noting “it is not incumbent upon the State to produce 
fingerprint evidence to prove guilt”). 
332. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506 (LexisNexis 2011). 
333. See Eley, 419 A.2d at 387. 
334. 880 A.2d 288, 291 (Md. 2005). 
335. Id. at 292. 
336. Id. (first alteration in original).  Additionally, the trial judge again informed the 
parties: “So it is perfectly clear, I’m denying your request, but I would permit you to 
say that your client is black, victim is white, but I will not let you refer to cross-racial 
identification.”  Id. at 293. 
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identification,337 and ultimately concluded that, within the specific 
milieu of a cross-racial identification by a witness who claimed to be 
especially adept at identifying individuals, “[d]efense counsel clearly 
was entitled to challenge [the] ‘educated’ identification of the 
defendants by arguing to the jury that her identification should not be 
accorded the weight that she credited to her own ability to identify 
them.”338   The Court came to this conclusion, despite acknowledging 
that “[a]t this juncture the extent to which own-race bias affects 
eyewitness identification is unclear based on the available studies 
addressing this issue, so that we cannot state with certainty that 
difficulty in cross-racial identification is an established matter of 
common knowledge.”339  Nevertheless, because “the victim’s 
identification of the defendants was anchored in her enhanced ability 
to identify faces . . . defense counsel should have been allowed to 
argue the difficulties of cross-racial identification in closing 
argument.”340  
If defense counsel is allowed to argue a controversial topic, such 
as the diminished weight to afford a cross-racial identification 
without affirmative evidence of the effect of that phenomena, counsel 
should be able to comment upon the failure to comply with the legal 
requirements for creating and administering more reliable 
extrajudicial identification procedures.  There can be no debate that 
every law enforcement agency in Maryland must adopt and 
implement a series of procedures that make the identification 
procedure more reliable.  When the evidence shows that law 
enforcement officers failed to comply with these requirements—and 
certainly if additional evidence, such as expert testimony shows that 
this violation of the statute affects the reliability of the 
identification—defense counsel should be allowed to comment upon 
the statutory violation, and its effect, in closing argument.  This 
modest defense is predicated on law enforcement’s failure to comply 
with the clear statutory guidelines for creating and administering an 
extrajudicial identification procedure.  
 
337. Id. at 294–98.  The Court noted that “a cross-racial identification occurs when an 
eyewitness of one race is asked to identify a particular individual of another race.”  
Id. at 294 (citing John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-
Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 211 (2001)). 
338. Id. at 300. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. 
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The necessity of a robust closing argument, focusing upon the 
failure to employ the procedures required by statute, highlights the 
commensurate need for the other remedies proposed in this article.  
For example, any argument must be based on the facts adduced at 
trial.341  To have the facts necessary to make this argument counsel 
must be allowed to cross-examine the officer or officers who created 
and administered the procedure to establish what was, and was not, 
done when the procedure was administered.342  More importantly, in 
order for the jury to fully grasp the importance of the failure to 
employ certain elements of the procedure, expert testimony may be 
necessary to show how compliance with the statutorily required 
procedures would increase the reliability of the identification and 
how the pertinent points of departure from the statutory policy 
decrease the reliability of the identification.343  
Finally, a jury instruction may be necessary to put the closing 
argument in its necessary context.  Absent a jury instruction, jurors 
will have no way of knowing that certain procedures are required 
under Maryland law when law enforcement officers create and 
administer an identification procedure.  In order to apply the law, 
jurors must first know the law.  Thus, without instructional guidance, 
jurors will not know that these procedures are not simply 
recommendations of defense counsel or of a defense expert, but are 
required by the General Assembly to increase the reliability of 
extrajudicial identifications in Maryland.  Maryland law has long 
recognized “a statement or instruction by the trial judge carries with 
it the imprimatur of a judge learned in the law, and therefore usually 
has more force and effect than if merely presented by counsel.”344  
Given that such an instruction is triggered only by law enforcement 
non-compliance with the statute, an instruction as to the legal 
requirements for creating and administering an identification 
 
341. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. State, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (Md. 1974) (noting that “counsel has 
the right to make any comment or argument that is warranted by the evidence proved 
or inferences therefrom”). 
342. See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text. 
343. See supra notes 259–71 and accompanying text. 
344. Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196–97 (Md. 2010) (quoting Hardison v. State, 172 A.2d 
407, 411 (Md. 1961)). 
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procedure may be necessary to provide the proper weight and context 
for defense closing argument.345   
Thus, consistent with the traditional leeway provided to counsel 
in closing argument, counsel should be able to note in argument that 
law enforcement officers failed to comply with statutorily required 
protocols for creating and administering an extrajudicial 
identification procedure, and that the failure to comply with these 
protocols affected the reliability (and resulting evidentiary weight) of 
the ensuing identification.  Counsel—and courts—should be fully 
aware that such an argument must be supported by the evidence in 
the case, and thus, counsel should adduce facts showing non-
compliance with the statutorily required protocols.  Courts should 
also be aware that this remedy should not be viewed in isolation, but 
should be viewed as the culmination of a series of trial remedies 
resulting from law enforcement non-compliance with the statute.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The truest goal of our criminal justice system should be to ensure 
that the guilty are convicted and the innocent remain free.  While 
neither law nor science will likely ever devise an accurate way to 
assay an eyewitness identification for ultimate accuracy, present 
science has identified ways in which the creation and administration 
of extrajudicial identification procedures may produce more reliable 
results.  The Maryland General Assembly has required every law 
enforcement agency in Maryland to adopt and implement these more 
reliable procedures.  A reliable process produces reliable results.  
Administration of more reliable identification procedures will 
ultimately produce identifications that have increased reliability.  
Therefore, inducing and encouraging adherence to the statutorily 
required procedures should ultimately promote the legislative goal—
hopefully shared by all participants in the criminal justice system—
and secure identifications that more often correctly identify the guilty 
and avoid wrongful identification of the innocent.  
For nearly four centuries, Marylanders have been known for their 
humble middle temperament.  This article seeks to move defense 
counsel away from viewing total suppression of an identification (on 
constitutional grounds) as the only defense tactic to respond to an 
 
345. See id. at 196 (explaining that “argument by counsel to the jury will naturally be 
imbued with a greater gravitas when it is supported by a[n] instruction on the same 
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identification and to utilize the new statutory reforms to seek 
intermediate remedies at trial.  This approach respects both the 
judicial retention of the high standard for constitutional suppression 
of an identification and the legislative adoption of certain procedures 
that increase the reliability of an extrajudicial identification; like the 
voyagers upon the Ark and the Dove, it seeks “a middle temperature 
between the two.”  This article is written to provide a roadmap as to 
how counsel for an individual identified in a non-compliant 
procedure may seek remedies at trial—and under existing Maryland 
law—in response to law enforcement’s non-compliance with the 
statutorily mandated procedure for creating and administering an 
extrajudicial identification procedure.  The ultimate goal of this 
article is that the availability of these remedies will encourage law 
enforcement agencies (and officers) to comply with the statute.  
Indeed, the author’s sincere hope is that these remedies will never be 
needed because law enforcement has acted in full fidelity to the 
statute.  Should these remedies ever be needed at trial, it is an even 
greater goal of the author that they will assist a jury in convicting a 
guilty person or appropriately allowing an innocent person to remain 
free.  
  
456 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
 
 
